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INTRODUCTION
There are very few active participants in corporate takeovers-directors,
lawyers, investment bankers, and judges.' Yet their collective decisions about
the fate of major corporations can greatly alter millions of lives, both near
term and far. 2 What guiding vision of the modern corporation and its
ultimate purpose informs the actions of these people? Do they believe the
corporation's aim is to maximize entity profits, enhance shareholder wealth,
behave as a good citizen, or do something else? The high stakes in takeover
transactions along with mounting concern over their effects on our corporate
system' make it fitting for both active participants and others to rethink a
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. B.A.
1973, Carleton College; J.D. 1978, University of Minnesota. The author wishes to thank Dean
Kirgis, Thomas Shaffer, Joseph Ulrich and David Millon for their comments on earlier drafts.
Financial support of the research for this Article was generously provided by the Frances Lewis
Law Center at Washington and Lee University.
1. Except for the changing role of target company, the cast of actors in takeovers is
fairly stable: until recently, only a handful of active bidders; a realtively small number of promi-
nent law and investment banking firms providing professional advice; and of course, Delaware
judges who are often implicated in many takeover attempts.
2. Mergers of large corporations and management responses to the threat of hostile
acquisition "affect stockholder profits, employee welfare, consumer choice, technological
innovation, the economic base of communities, and the new capital investment plans of the
nation." K. DAVIDSON, MEGAMERGERS xiv (1985).
3. Concern about takeover activity extends to the possible harmful effects of threatened
as well as actual takeovers. See, e.g., Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A
Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1145, 1221-50 (1984) (comprehensive explication of diseconornies associated with frequent
takeover activity); Williams, It's Time for a Takeover Moratorium, FORTUNE, July 22, 1985, at
133-34 (expression of concern about takeover activity by former Securities and Excbange
Commission Chairman). See infra Section B of Part III.
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basic question: "Whose interests, really, do we expect corporations and their
managements to serve?"
4
This question-particularly for those companies actually embroiled in
takeovers, but pertinent to others as well-is especially timely in light of
three recent developments. First, there is a discernible effort by courts to
require greater management allegiance to shareholder interests in takeovers.'
Second, with increasing frequency management seeks to "pre-empt" takeover
threats by leveraging and restructuring corporations for the purpose of
making substantial distributions to shareholders. 6 Third, while shareholders
clearly benefit from such preemptive efforts and from takeover-generated
premiums, there are growing concerns and evidence that other interests
vitally dependent on significant corporations, including society's interest in
an efficient use of its resources, may not be well served.
7
How one responds to these developments depends on one's expectations
of corporate behavior. For those who have long decried management's lack
of meaningful accountability to shareholders, greater attentiveness to investor
well being is good news. In fact, by resolving that great bugaboo of corporate
governance-how to discipline an autonomous, unresponsive management,-
takeovers may restore shareholders to a place of central importance in the
corporation.9 For those who are equally concerned that corporations be
managed to serve a variety of noninvestor interests, the developments are
potentially disturbing. 10 If there is a clear divergence of investor and impor-
4. The subject of corporate objectives and responsibility, while of ongoing interest,
resurfaces with especial intensity at various times. Periodically, as in the 1930's and 1970's, the
legitimacy of corporate power is challenged and defended as society at large seeks reassurance
that the benefits of corporate social and economic power outweigh resulting problems. See
Buxbaum, Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory, and Legal Doctrine, 45 OHIo ST. L. J.
515, 517-20 (1984). The frenzy of takeover activity in the past decade, along with public
confusion over whether such activity is generally good, again have raised the subject of corporate
purpose.
S. See infra Section C of Part II.
6. See infra Section B of Part IIl.
7. See infra Section A of Part IlI.
8. Since Berle and Means, the central issue in corporate law has been the governance
ramifications of the separation of ownership and control in public corporations. A. BERLE &
G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
9. See, e.g., Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841 (1981) ("Indeed, ... the market for
corporate control may be the only potentially serious force for limiting management discre-
tion,"); Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALI Corporate Governance Project,
70 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 27 (1984) ("[T]he market for corporate control in general, and tender
offers in particular, are the most important disciplinary factors in the corporate governance
system, and should be encouraged.")
10. It is increasingly recognized that there are many groups in society that have a strong
interest in the activities of large corporations, and many contend that the claims of at least
certain of these groups ought to be expressly considered in models of corporate decisionmaking.
See, e.g., M. Aoxi, THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRm (1984) (proposing cooperative
game theory of firm in which both shareholders and employees are members). This being the
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tant noninvestor interests," then for these people the basic issue is whether
the wealth and governance gains to shareholders are "worth" the perceived
costs of takeovers. That evaluation requires a judgment as to exactly which
interests corporations facing or expecting a hostile takeover should further-
only those of capital providers, or a wider field of claims.
Even more fundamentally, a divergence of interests raises the possibility
that current decisionmaking mechanisms do not equip beleaguered corpora-
Lions to achieve what is best for shareholders while also suitably serving the
interests of other claimants. If that apparatus is unable to accommodate
investors and a broader base of constituents, then either a hard choice of
preferred interests must be made, or new decisionmaking arrangements better
able to reconcile various considerations must be sought.
For several reasons much commentary on the governance implications
of takeovers has neglected the critical question of corporate objectives. First,
courts have been so lenient in examining a target corporation's defensive
case, there is increasing uneasiness with the following traditional premise:
the stockholders are the corporation, and undivided loyalty is owed to the stockhold-
ers. If the corporation is viewed simply as a gollection of capital pooled for the
purpose of profits, then the premise is plausible; the sole interest of the corporation
is gain for the shareholders. This is the traditional conception of the corporation.
There is, however, substantial doubt that this is an adequate conception of the modern
business corporation. There is an increasing weight of opinion that the corporation
should be viewed as a social and economic institution which has interests other than
those of the shareholders that it can and ought to serve.
Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4
J, Comp. CoRP. L. & Sac. REG. 155, 170 (1982). For another challenge to the traditional view
that a corporation is an economic institution existing only to bring gain to its shareholders, see
White, How Should We Talk About Corporations? The Language of Economics and Citizenship,
94 YALE L. J. 1416 (1985). Professor Eisenberg would classify these views as variations of a"political" model of the corporation. Eisenberg, Corporate Legitimacy, Conduct, and Gover-
nance, Two Models of the Corporation, 17 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1 (1983) (describing and
contrasting Political and Economic Models of business firm). Cf. A. BEaia, THE 20rn
CENTURY CAIAusr REVOLTnIoN 179 (1954) ("American political thought has been frightened,
and corporations themselves have been frightened, at any suggestion that they might emerge as
political institutions in their own and separate right.").
11. There are, of course, a great variety of concerns about the effects of takeover
activity-actual and threatened-on persons and groups other than shareholders. One way to
classify many of these misgivings is to separate a concern for the effects on persons whose lives
are immediately affected by a particular corporation from concerns that are more national in
scope. "Stakeholders" in specific corporations such as employees, suppliers, creditors, cus-
tomers, and local enterprise-dependent communities fall within the former category. Diversion
of credit to unproductive uses, narrow management focus on short jun economic performance,
inordinate use of debt, and waste of society's resources are oft-cited concerns about takeovers
that fall within the latter category. Obviously, the distinction is somewhat artificial since many
corporate activities affect both categories. Nonetheless, it serves as a reminder that while there
are many persons and groups interested in the fate of individual corporations, there is also a
larger societal concern about the cumulative effects of takeover activity. In this article, the term
"noninvestor" is used to refer to such nonshargholder interests. The term is not meant to
imply, however, that such interests are not "Invested" in the entity simply because money
capital has not been contributed to the corporation.
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measures that commentators understandably have emphasized the need for
stricter judicial scrutiny of those actions.' 2 The question of exactly which
interests management should favor can arise only if courts are willing to
provide meaningful review of management's takeover behavior. That has
happened only recently. Second, many commentators assume that, at least
over the nebulous "long run," shareholder and other important interests
generally coincide.' 3 They argue that by devotedly seeking to maximize
stockholder wealth as measured by share prices, management also furthers
the collective welfare of society. 4 In particular, this belief is held by those
who consider takeovers to be instrumental in reallocating economic resources
to more highly valued uses.' 5 Third, for the most part there has been no
widely accepted evidence of any divergence of interests, most such claims
being conjectural or anecdotal, and heretofore lacking in empirical support.
Recent evidence on the adverse efficiency outcomes of many acquisitions, 6
12. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
13. The notion that, over the long run, shareholder and societal well being generally
coincide is one tenet in what Professor Eisenberg calls the Economic Model of the firm: "[M]anaging
the corporation in the interest of the shareholders is socially desirable in that their interest
coincides with the social interest in efficiency." Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 5. Professor Stone
considers the belief that maximization of shareholder wealth also maximizes the collective good
to rest on "a crude sort of utilitarianism." Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility: What it
Might Mean If it Were Really to Matter, 71 IOWA L. REv. 557, 570 (1986).
14. Professor Demsetz has testified that "takeovers and tender offers serve the interests
of both shareholders and the nation." Securities and Exchange Commission Proceedings:
Economic Forum on Tender Offers 16 (February 20, 1985) (statement by Professor Demsetz)
(copy on file at the Washington and Lee Law Review office) [hereinafter cited as SEC Economic
Forum]. The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers for 1985 also concluded that
takeovers both increased national wealth and enhanced shareholder well being:
The available evidence, however, is that mergers and acquisitions increase national
wealth. They improve efficiency, transfer scarce resources to higher valued uses, and
stimulate effective corporate management .... The evidence is overwhelming that
successful takeovers substantially increase the wealth of stockholders in target com-
panies.
Economic Report of the President, transmitted to Congress together with the Annual Report
of the Council of Economic Advisors, February, 1985, at 196-197 [hereinafter cited as 1985
Economic Report]. These views are excellent examples of a principal tenet of the Economic
Model of the firm described by Professor Eisenberg. See supra, notes 10, 13.
15. Id. See also, Bradley and Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 1378, 1410-11 (1986). Whether takeovers in fact usefully reallocate resources is a critical
question. Orthodox economic theory holds that profit maximizing behavior has that allocative
effect. Not only does successful profit maximizing behavior redound to the benefit of share-
holders in the form of higher stock prices, higher net prices of the acquiror and target shares
as a result of a takeover are reasoned to reflect gains in allocative efficiency. Infra notes 139-
40 and accompanying text. This is a theoretical claim. If, however, takeover-induced stock price
movements have causes other than misallocated resources, then the supposed connection between
shareholder gain from stock premiums and society's gain in efficiency is broken. That is not to
say that profit maximizing behavior does not result in an efficient use of resources, but simply
to suggest that seeking to maximize shareholder wealth as an independent end by generating
takeover premiums may not lead to the same result.
16. See infra Section A of Part III.
[Vol. 43:781
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
however, along with Professor Coffee's suggestion that management preemp-
tive measures may bode badly for noninvestors, 7 should re-open this issue.
Fourth, were any divergence of interests demonstrated, many believe
that shareholders alone are the proper constituency of corporate manage-
ment. 8 Without question there are serious difficulties associated with the
oft-advanced view that management should serve as a kind of Platonic
guardian for noninvestor interests.' 9 Yet, reducing corporate activity to the
monistic pursuit of shareholder gain by conceiving the business enterprise as
a two-party venture of shareholder and management is not without problems
of its own. For example, it is not always made clear exactly why short-term
speculators or any investors seeking to liquidate their investment en masse
should, as nominal "owners," 20 have a right to determine the fate of an
enterprise they wish to leave. 2' Conceding that management should consci-
17. See infra Section B of Part 111.
18. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1216-1221. Other commentators believe that shareholder
interests and society's desire for efficiency coincide, and that shareholders are the sole constit-
uency of management. Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1190-92 (1982); Gilson, supra note
9, at 862-865.
19. Several commentators have argued that management may consider the interests of
nonshareholder constituencies in formulating takeover responses. See, e.g., Lipton, Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 105-06, 117, 122 (1979); Steinbrink,
Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 882, 899-900, 902
(1978); Speech by Harold M. Williams, "Tender Offers and Corporate Directors," reprinted in
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,445, 82,445; McDaniel, Bondholders
and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413 (1986) (arguing that directors should have
fiduciary duty to bondholders); Steinberg, Some Thoughts on Regulation of Tender Offers, in
TENDER OFFERS: DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARIES 273, 283 & n.41, 293-94 & nn.82-85 (M.
Steinberg ed. 1985) (arguing that management should be entitled to consider noninvestor interests
if it can prove that a tender offer threatens deserving interests). See also, Greene & Junewicz, A
Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 717-
18, 732-739 (1984); Sommer, Hostile Tender Offers: Time for a Review of Fundamentals, in
TENDER OFFERS: DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARIES 251, 264-68 (M. Steinberg ed. 1985)
(suggesting that state corporate statutes envisioned role for directors in acquisitions as voice for
entity that would temper tendency of shareholders to vote selfishly).
20. Many commentators no longer view shareholders as "owners" of the corporation in
the traditional sense. See N. WOLFSON, THE MODERN CoRPoRATIoN, 40-41 (1984) (shareholders
are risk takers); Baysinger & Butler, Race for the Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The ALI Project
and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J. CORP. L. 431, 433 n.9 (1985) (same); Easterbrook &
Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & EcON. 395, 396 (1983) (shareholders are no more
"owners of firm than bondholders or employees); Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance,
and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173, 177 (1981) (typical shareholder does not think of himself
as owner, but as investor free to invest and disinvest without loyalty to entity). Nonetheless,
the "ownership" model of the shareholder's relationship to the corporation still pervades the
law. Soderquist & Vecchio, Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and Corporate Rsponsibility: New
Guidelines for Management, 1978 DUKE L.J. 819, 823-24.
21. If shareholders do not "own" the corporation (only its stock) then their claim on the
corporation does not stem from property rights, but from their position as risk bearers. Kripke,
supra note 20, at 177-78. Yet, in many takeovers, particularly "break-up" acquisitions, others
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entiously seek long run profit maximization for the entity, thereby enhancing
shareholder wealth, does not logically entitle shareholders as a body to
shorten the time frame of their investment and essentially withdraw their
capital from the business when a tender offer is presented. While alienability
of stock and free movement of capital generally are desirable, allowing
shareholders to impose the consequences of an altered liquidity preference
on those with less mobile resources, even in the name of "ownership"
prerogative, is not without costs. 22 This whole issue of the nature and strength
of a shareholder's claim on a corporation in the takeover setting needs
reexamination.23
also face risk; specifically, the risk, unrewarded by the prospect of a stock premium, that
shareholders will change management-established corporate policy either directly by selling their
stock to a bidder or, indirectly, by inducing management to make changes in its policy out of
fear of such a sale. See infra Section B of Part 11I.
22. Certain of the costs associated with unlimited nobility of capital may not be economic
or quantifiable. For example, diversion of management time and attention from pressing
business issues is one cost in a highly competitive international marketplace, Another cost is
the lessening of corporate loyalty, an important but intangible factor in business success. As
takeovers and efforts to avoid them lead to large employee layoffs, the result is a substantial
reduction in employee morale: "We used to be a community-employees, shareholders, lots of
groups. We were committed to this company.... Now it's clear there is only one important
group-the shareholders." Remarks of long-time Exxon Corporation employee, as quoted in
The End of Corporate Loyalty? Bus. WK., August 4, 1986, at 42, 44. See Baldwin, The
takeover boom: An employee speaks out, The Christian Science Monitor, July 28, 1986 at 14,
See also Kelley, Allowing the Factory Shutdown: Proposed Legislation as Justification, 2 NOTRE
DAME J. OF L. ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 329, 332-333 (1985) (describing costs to employees
and communities associated with abrupt plant closings).
Another more visible cost is the extraordinary professional fees that are paid in many
transactions. For example, it has been estimated that the Safeway takeover fracas will result in
the payment of approximately $150 million in lawyer, banking and other fees, Mayer, Deal
Makers Cashing In On Takeover Mania, Wash. Post, Aug. 10, 1986, at KI.
23. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 (Tent. Draft No, 2, 1984) (tentatively adopted at the May, 19.84 ALI
meeting) [hereinafter cited as PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]. Section 2.01 of the
Principles of Corporate Governance deals with corporate objectives and reads in part,
"[a] business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business ac-
tivities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain."
By describing the "economic objective" of the corporation in this dual manner, the section
suggests that corporate profit and shareholder gain are not identical. Yet, the section does not
deal with possible "tensions between corporate profit and shareholder gain," leaving those to
be "dealt with in Part VI [corporate control transactions] and elsewhere." Id., comment e.
Presumably, in operating decisions maximizing corporate profits also enhances shareholder
gain. Moreover, many economists believe that increasing shareholder wealth is desirable because
such a focus also results in an efficient use of resources. This position is reflected in the remarks
of Professor Oliver Williamson of Yale University who serves as one of two economic advisers
to the Principles of Corporate Goverance project and who believes that shareholder gain should
be the only corporate aim:
Maximization of shareholder gain has a much sharper edge Ithan maximizing
long-run corporate profit]. Put differently, maximization of long-run corporate profits
has embedded in it more degrees of freedom. I think that the integrity of the enterprise
mode of organization is better protected by adhering to the stockholder gain criterion,
[Vol. 43:781
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
Finally, many observers contend that any untoward consequences of a
corporation's singular focus on shareholder well being are the province of
"public policy," not "private" decisionmaking. 24 As long as management's
is the only private voice, this position may be understandable. Nonetheless,
public policy, coming as it does from wholly outside the enterprise, often
deals in aggregates, and can sometimes be a blunt and overinclusive instru-
ment of relief. Unless takeovers are monolithic in origin and outcome, at
crucial points in the takeover process each transaction must be assessed
individually, a task that may benefit from the airing of multiple perspectives.
Thus, those philosophically opposed to intrusive public action in corporate
activity might be expected to seek eagerly for novel ways of attaining greater
"private" rather than "public" influence on this issue.
In any event, despite Congressional interest in hostile takeovers in 1984-
85,2 federal takeover policy remains narrowly-and apparently unalterably-
concerned with investor well being. 26 Moreover, constitutional objections
recognizing that such maximization is subject to certain legal, ethical, and social cost
constraints.
My argument here relies on the underlying proposition that the corporation is
preeminently an engine of efficiency. Restriction of the objective of the corporation
to stockholder gain preserves this emphasis .... I think that if you are interested in
an economist's orientation to this subject, that that probably is not uniformly shared
but widely shared.
Remarks of Professor Williamson, 59 A.L.I. PROC. 426 (1982). See also THE CORPORATE
ECONOMY xxii (R. Marris & A. Woods, eds. 1971) ("From a 'classical' viewpoint, 'correct'
behavior by managers in general should be aimed at maximizing at all times the aggregate value
of all equity shares .... ).
Whatever the case in operating decisions, what if requiring corporations to maximize
shareholder gain in takeovers does not result in a more efficient use of resources? Or what if it
does so, but with an abruptness that imposes other costs? What then is the corporate objective?
While many interests can be accommodated in the looser goal of long-run profit maximization,
the "sharper" aim of shareholder gain once a corporation is, or perceives itself to be, a takeover
target may prevent rather than achieve efficiency or other social good. If so, an important
underpinning for retaining that corporate objective in takeovers falls away, leaving shareholder
gain as its own justification. The question then is whether that alone is a sufficient basis for
deciding how corporations should respond to takeovers. While § 2.01 does not address the
possibility of such a divergence of interest, it will be a very real issue in Part VI of the Principles
of Corporate Governance, particularly if shareholder interests continue to find allies in court.
See infra Section C of Part II.
24. See, e.g., SEC Economic Forum, supra note 14, at 16 (statement by Professor
Demsetz); Coffee, supra note 3, at 1220-21; see also Kripke, supra note 20, at 184-86.
25. See Matheson and Norberg, Hostile Share Acquisitions and Corporate Governance:
A Framework for Evaluating Takeover Activities, 47 U. Prmr. L. Ray. 407, 414 n.19 (1986)
(description of recently introduced legislation regarding hostile takeovers). Indicative of the
complexity of the takeover issue is the remark of Congressman Timothy Wirth, Chairman of
the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance, House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, who has held extensive hearings on the subject of
corporate takeovers: ". . . the more I know about the issue, the less sure I am about what to
do." Phillips, Congress Responds to Hostile Tender Offers, The Bus. Law. Update, September/
October 1985, at 3.
26. The Williams Act, 82 Stat. 454 (1934), (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(m)(d)-(e) and
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have continuted to frustrate state legislation aimed at providing some con-
sideration of noninvestor interests in the post-MITE era.27 Thus, unavoidably,
management, its advisers, and courts are left to fashion piecemeal answers
to the question of appropriate corporate behavior and objectives.
That this responsibility has utlimately fallen to judges became very clear
when the Delaware Supreme Court held in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc. that, once a target company is acknowledged to be for
sale, the directors' sole duty is to obtain the highest premium for shareholders,
regardless of the effect of such action on other constituencies.2 8 While the
Revlon facts involved an inevitable corporate break-up and director conflict
of interest, the language of the opinion is broad, and the Court enunciated
clear limitations on the place of noninvestor factors in director deliberations.
Given the turmoil that takeovers have caused in corporate life and
corporate law, it seems appropriate to reconsider the issue of corporate
purpose. Assessing the utility of a phenomenon (takeovers) or the legitimacy
of an institution (corporations) is easier if there is a clear sense of what is
expected of them. Perhaps takeover activity is a great boon, not only
enriching shareholders, but hastening the inevitable process of economic
readjustment for the eventual good of society. On the other hand, perhaps
the very speed with which such activity causes readjustment is its greatest
drawback, a more orderly realignment providing time for thoughtful adap-
tation to change. The purpose of this Article is not to argue for a particular
objective for corporate behavior, say preferring investor over noninvestor
considerations, or vice versa. Instead, the aim simply is to argue that the
three developments noted earlier coalesce to raise the issue of corporate
purpose, and that this issue must be confronted to assess and deal with
takeover activity effectively.
Part I briefly surveys an earlier debate, prompted by the Berle-Dodd
exchange, on the proper focus of corporate management. Professor Dodd's
position, published at a time of widespread disenchantment with the corpo-
rate institution, was that managers of the modern public corporation must
act as "trustees" for a variety of interests. This view was contrary to a
central tenet of economic orthodoxy-that shareholder wealth maximization
is the proper aim of management. Yet, for various reasons, corporate law
78(n)(d)-(f)). The Williams Act clearly has as its aim the protection of investors. Id. See Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982) (Illinois Business Take-Over Act held to impose
impermissible burden on interstate commerce); Bradley and Rosenzweig, supra note 15, at 1401-
1407.
27. See Johnson, Minnesota's Control Share Acquisition Statute And the Need For New
Judicial Analysis Of State Takeover Legislation, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 183, 191-92 n.29
(1986) (collecting decisions); see also Dynamics Corporation of America v. CTS Corporation,
794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986) (Indiana Control Share Acquisition statute unconstitutional), cert.
granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3233 (1986); Fleet Aero-Space Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th
Cir. 1986) (Ohio Control Share Acquisition statute unconstitutional); Terry v. Yamashita, 643
F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986) (Hawaii Control Share Acquisition statute unconstitutional).
28. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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has provided managers with the necessary antecedent to the role Dodd
envisioned for them-considerable discretion. Discussions of corporate gov-
ernance have centered largely on how best to limit this discretion and assure
that it is not used to the detriment of shareholders. As takeovers came to be
touted for this function, however, target management often responded by
contending with Dodd that indeed it was a trustee for a corporation's many
constituencies and, accordingly, must resist on their behalf.
29
Part II reviews several decisions in which management asserted that its
defensive measures were designed to protect noninvestor constituencies. Until
Revlon, and other recent decisions, courts generally upheld various defensive
actions because of a failure to distinguish duty to "corporation" and duty
to shareholder. Revlon indicates that decisional law at last may be joining
economic orthodoxy and public policy in regarding shareholders as the pro-
per constituency of management in takeovers.
While shareholders clearly win from such a judicial trend and the related
development of management preemptive measures, Part III describes emerg-
ing concerns that other interests in society may lose. While evidence on how
various interests fare in takeovers is still developing, there is some question
of a possible divergence of interests, thereby returning us to the question of
corporate purpose earlier raised by Berle and Dodd.
Part IV sketches three perspectives for dealing with a potential divergence
of interests and suggests that arguing in terms of whether target management
should favor one or another set of interests when making takeover-related
decisions is problematic. Unless takeover activity is to be dealt with entirely
at the aggregate policy level, such management-centered perspectives might
fruitfully yield to an approach whereby management is not the sole decision-
making body on the outcome of attempted takeovers. Again, however, the
aim of this Article is largely to draw attention, not to prescribe.
I. EXPECTATIONS OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
A. Whose Interests Should Autonomous Management Serve?
As corporations grew larger and their business affairs more complicated
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they increasingly needed
skilled managers as well as reliable sources of capital. Since Berle and Means'
classic work30 it is "conventional wisdom" 3' that those possessing manage-
29. See, e.g., SEC Economic Forum, supra note 14, at 135-49, 156-58 (statement by
Philip O'Connell, Senior Vice President of Champion International, testifying on behalf of The
Business Roundtable); Blade, A Takeover Debate: Jacobs v. Pentair Chief, Minneapolis Star &
Trib., June 1, 1985, at 9B (Chairman of Pentair, Inc. challenged view of Irwin Jacobs that
shareholder interests should come first and asserted that companies should be managed for
benefit of "stakeholders" such as employees, communities, customers, suppliers, and society as
well).
30. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPOATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
31. E. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL, CORPORATE POWER 9 (1981).
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ment expertise have come to play the critical role in formulating and
implementing corporate policy-and in selecting their colleagues and replace-
ments-while widely dispersed capital providers, unable to coordinate efforts
to monitor management, play a largely passive role. Although separation of
the ownership and management functions undoubtedly is necessary for the
effective operation of a complex business, it clearly reduces the voice of the
corporation's "owners.
3 2
Beyond the exigencies of business practice, another reason shareholders
have little say in corporate affairs is that modern corporate statutes assign
them a very limited function. While shareholders formally possess the power
to elect and remove directors, 33 amend the organic documents, 34 and approve
fundamental changes in corporate structure, 5 often these actions also require
express board involvement 36 or are effectively controlled by the board. Taken
together, the separation of functions and the statutory norm, along with
generally deferential judicial review of management activities, have led to a
"substantial erosion of shareholder participation" in corporate decisionmak-
ing.37 The resulting inability of shareholders to hold management accountable
for its behavior continues to trouble legal scholars.38
Interestingly, Berle and Means' description of the allocation of power
within the corporation coincided with the assertion that such an important
institution ought not be managed solely to serve shareholders anyway.
Instead, Professor Dodd argued that management of public corporations
must be sensitive to its new position as "trustee" for a wide array of
interests, including employees, customers, and society at large.39 In this view
of management, its essential function is not merely to act as "attorneys for
stockholders, "40 but to mediate and strike a balance among the various
constituencies of a corporation. 41 Professor Berle, on the other hand, insisted
32. Certain scholars who believe that the market effectively disciplines management on
behalf of shareholders might dispute the assertion that investors have little control over corporate
affairs. See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 20, at 18 ("None of the Berle and Means' discussion,
with the literal exception of one or two isolated anecdotal examples, ever proves that free-
market forces do not discipline management or that control systematically uses its power to
harm shareholders or the public."); Hetherington, Redefining the Task of Corporation Law,
19 U.S.F. L. REv. 229 (1985). See infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 211(b), 141(k) (1983).
34. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 109, 242 (1983).
35. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 251, 271, 275 (1983).
36. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 242(b)(1) (charter amendment), §§ 252-62
(merger), §§ 271-84 (sale of substantially all assets) (1983). While Delaware's corporate laws are
often singled out as particularly pro-management, many other states have also provided
management with considerable flexibility and discretion.
37. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 1671, 1683 (1985).
38. Id; Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1410 n.19 (1985).
39. Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932).
40. Id. at 1160.
41. See, e.g., AOKI, supra note 10, at 172-73.
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that all corporate powers are "necessarily and at all times exercisable only
for the ratable benefit of all the stockholders as their interests appear.)
42
Thus, while it was generally undisputed that management had become
largely autonomous, there was serious disagreement as to whether this
autonomy was a problem lest management stray from its duties to share-
holders, or an opportunity for management to better serve important non-
investor interests. Whatever the proper touchstone of management behavior,
one obvious danger of a management that is neither responsive to sharehold-
ers nor somehow controlled by other private or public groups is that it is
free to pursue its own self-serving vision of the enterprise.43 This concern
prompted some, who both welcomed the loosened grip of shareholders on
management and doubted that management itself could be dependably relied
on as the instrument for socially responsible behavior, to seek new decision-
making arrangements "within" the firm. Professor Chayes articulated this
need as follows:
A more spacious conception of [corporate]'membership', and one
closer to the facts of corporate life, would include all those having
a relation of sufficient intimacy with the corporation or subject to
its power in a sufficiently specified way. Their rightful share in
decisions on the exercise of corporate power would be exercised
through an institutional arrangement appropriately designed to rep-
resent the interests of a constituency of members having a significant
common relation to the corporation and its power.
It is not always easy to identify such constituencies nor is it always
clear what institutional forms are appropriate for recognizing their
interests. The effort to answer those questions is among the most
meaningful tasks of the American legal system."
Exciting and laudable as that task may have been, it is fair to conclude
that little has been done to formalize the relationship of various constituen-
42. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers In Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931). The
exchange between Professors Berle and Dodd continued. See Berle, For Whom Corporate
Manager are Trustees, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1365 (1932); Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 194, 205-07 (1935).
Later, Professor Dodd somewhat backed away from his initial view, stating that the concept of
trusteeship was a "misnomer" and a "misleading metaphor." Dodd, Book Review, 9 U. Cm.
L. REV. 538, 547 (1942). On the other hand, in 1954 Professor Berle stated that their exchange
had "been settled (at least for the time being) in favor of Professor Dodd's contention." A.
BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALISr REVOLUTION, 169 (1954). That is not to say, however,
that Professor Berle considered Dodd's initial position to be the proper outcome, only that the
initial position is "how social fact and judicial decisions turned out." A. Berle, Forward, to E.
MASON, THE CoRPoRATION IN MODERN Socim (1959) at xii. See Weiner, The Berle-Dodd
Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964).
43. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends is Corporate Management Responsible? in
MASON, supra note 42, at 46, 62.
44. Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in MASON, supra note 42, at
25. For a critique of Professor Chayes' views, see Rostow, supra note 43.
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cies to the internal governance of the American corporation. 4 Generally,
any protection from the effects of corporate behavior provided to noninvestor
constituencies has been imposed from "outside" the enterprise.4 Thus, those
who regarded the slack in management-shareholder relations as an occasion
for more corporation-initiated responsible action foundered on the difficult
task of translating that noble goal into organizational reality.
47
There was an even more fundamental obstacle to the design of new
arrangements to better serve noninvestor interests. Many people-notably
economists-simply rejected the idea that corporations, now that manage-
ment had supposedly been "freed" of its obligation to capital providers,
ought expressly to serve a broader set of interests. 48 Instead, the orthodox
view held that management was obliged to concentrate solely on serving the
economic interests of shareholders. 49 Many believed that in so orienting itself,
management ultimately advances the public welfare as well. 0 Oftentimes,
however, the case for this position was made less by a convincing argument
that it is socially expedient or morally "just" for corporations to maximize
shareholder wealth than by contending that the goal of wealth maximization
constrains management by providing clear guidance for its behavior. Fried-
rich Hayek expressed this viewpoint in arguing that public intervention into
corporate activities would surely follow from a "trust" conception of
management:
So long as the management has the one overriding duty of admin-
istering the resources under its control as trustees for the shareholders
45. The American corporate structure is in contrast, for example, to employee partici-
pation in corporate decisionmaking in certain European countries. See, e.g., AOKI, supra note
10, Ch. 10. See also Wedderburn, The Legal Development of Corporate Responsibility, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES 3 (K. Hopt and G. Teubner eds. 1985).
46. Particular groups and interests are the intended beneficiaries of specific legislation
designed to protect from the effects of corporate behavior. For example, there is anti-trust and
product safety legislation to protect consumers; legislation to protect the health and safety,
right to collectively bargain, and pension benefits of employees; fraudulent conveyance laws
and federal bankruptcy laws to protect creditors; and state and federal legislation to protect the
environment. Greater levels of such governmental action partially explain why Professor Dodd
appeared to pull back somewhat from his earlier trust conception of management. Dodd, Book
Review, supra note 42.
47. Stone, supra note 13, at 558-59. Professor Stone believes that the failure to propose
concrete methods of achieving institutional reform is the major weakness of much of the
literature on corporate responsibility. Id.
48. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, 133 (1962) (for corporate managers
to do anything other than maximize profits for shareholders is "fundamentally subversive
doctrine" that could "thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society").
49. AOKI, supra note 10, at 3. The dominant assumption in corporate finance is that
management will concentrate solely on serving shareholder interest. See, e.g., BRUDNEY &
CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE, 3 (2d ed. 1979) ("Many financial writers ... [say] that
the aim of the firm should be to maximize the market price per share of its stock-that is, to
achieve the highest sustainable market value for the company's common shares."); Remarks of
Professor Williamson, supra note 23.
50. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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and for their benefit, its hands are largely tied; and it will have no
arbitrary power to benefit this or that particular interest. But once
the management of a big enterprise is regarded as not only entitled
but even obliged to consider in its decision whatever is regarded as
the public or social interest, or to support good causes and generally
to act for the public benefit, it gains indeed an uncontrollable
power-a power which could not long be left in the hands of private
managers but would inevitably be made the subject of increasing
public control."'
Whatever the rationales for regarding shareholder welfare as the proper
end of corporate behavior, that clearly is the predominant view of the firm.
The result is that while "corporate responsibility" to a wider range of
interests is a continuing concern, 2 it has stayed on the fringes of corporate
law, never being worked into mainstream corporate governance discussions
of the manager-investor relationship.
B. Attaining Management Loyalty to Shareholders
While conventional economic theory rejected Dodd's trust conception of
management in favor of shareholder wealth maximization, that prescription
for corporate behavior left unchanged Berle and Means' description of the
modem corporation as providing management with considerable discretion.
Thus, the major "problem" for those who accepted shareholder well being
as the proper end of corporate behavior was ensuring that management
diligently pursued that goal. There were two dimensions to this problem.
The first concerned the question of whether it was proper at all, given the
goal of profit maximization, for management to engage in such socially
responsible behavior as, for example, making charitable donations of cor-
porate funds. Since American corporations rarely have been accused of
engaging in too much socially responsible behavior and, since modest amounts
of such behavior are easily defended as being in the "long run" interests of
shareholders, few objected to such expenditures. Consequently, the law did
little to inhibit management in this area.
3
51. 3 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY. A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL
PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 82 (1982). See also Rostow, supra note 43, at
67, 71; FRIEDMAN, supra note 48, at 133-34.
52. See, e.g., Schwartz, Defining the Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALI's
Principles, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511, 521-22 (1984); Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate
Governance, 45 OHIo ST. L. J. 545, 545-51 (1984).
53. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 63
(1979); Wedderburn, supra note 45, at 10-11. See A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,
13 N.J. 145, 147, 98 A.2d 581, 583, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953). In A.P. Smith
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, a charitable contribution was upheld by the New Jersey Supreme
Court because present "conditions require that corporations acknowledge and discharge social
as well as private responsibilities." Id. That decision served as a modern judicial response to
the earlier pro-shareholder decision in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 506-07, 170
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The second aspect focused on how to prevent management from utilizing
its discretion, not to act in a socially responsible manner, but to shirk or
favor its own rather than investor interests. This concern arose because,
economic theory aside, neither the law nor institutional reality has ever
regarded management as the simple "agent" of shareholders.14 Rather, the
law has accorded management considerable discretion and flexibility in
operating the corporation"5 and, in conjunction with institutional reality, also
made it very difficult for investors to challenge the exercise of managerial
prerogatives. Thus, there is sufficient "slack" for management both to act
socially responsible-at the expense of shareholders-and to shirk and favor
itself-at the expense of shareholders. Unobjectionable as limited socially
responsible action might be, at least when not patently and consistently
contrary to shareholder interests, shirking and self-serving behavior by
management are universally rejected.16 Such behavior is particularly offensive
if engaged in more frequently than investors reasonably expect and if those
who engage in such behavior are not easily held to account.
Commentators have given considerable thought to ways in which the law
might better ensure management allegiance to investor ends rather than to
its own. These include, among more traditional solutions, revitalized "share-
holder democracy, ' 5 7 perhaps a more likely prospect with the increased
holdings of institutional investors;58 more meaningful intra-corporate litiga-
N.W. 668, 684 (1919) and led Professor Berle to concede that Dodd's trust concept of corporate
management had prevailed. See infra note 42.
One practical concern raised by takeovers is whether, as a defensive measure, corporate
management will reduce or forego altogether charitable and humanitarian efforts. Such efforts,
if significant, might be regarded by shareholders and bidders as "fat" to be cut out at a profit.
If so, the market for corporate control may make such behavior, though legally permissible
under § 2.01 of the Principles of Corporate Governance, less likely. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 23, at § 2.01(a).
54. M. EISENaERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 2-3 (1976); Brudney, supra note
38, at 1428.
55. "Flexibility" for management in the operation of the corporation is the hallmark of
many modern corporate statutes, including the recently revised Model Business Corporation
Act. See Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1455,1455 (1986). For a critique
of the Model Business Corporation Act's "flexibility" rationale, see Branson, Countertrends in
Corporation Law: Model Business Corporation Act Revision, British Company Law Reform,
And Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure, 68 MINN. L. REv. 53 (1983).
56. Brudney, supra note 38, at 1416, n.33 ("Although managerial literature sometimes
speaks in terms of business statesmen reconciling interests of the many constituencies of the
corporation, there is no suggestion that management's powers exist to permit it to favor
itself;. ..").
57. A belief in shareholder democracy motivates the federal securities laws, particularly
the proxy rules of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. At the state level certain substantive
provisions of corporate statutes such as cumulative voting, preemptive rights, shareholder
approval of certain transactions, and prohibiting classification of directors are sometimes
advocated as ways of "protecting" shareholders if not also providing them with an effective
"voice." Many consider such efforts to be futile and misdirected. See, e.g., Kripke, supra note
20, at 176 n.13.
58. While the concentration of stock in institutional hands has led some to regard
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tion;5 9 a federal law of corporations or of fiduciary standards to prevent
states from competing for the corporate chartering business-by offering lax
corporate laws;60 and closer judicial review of particular kinds of management
behavior to reverse a perceived erosion of fiduciary strictures.61 In spite of
extensive discussions of governance reform, however, many still regard the
modern shareholder as unfairly vulnerable to management abuse.
6 2
Certain economists and legal scholars provide an altogether different
view of the interplay between investor and management interests. Rejecting
the search for better "rules" to eradicate management discretion, these
commentators believe that shareholder and management interests are ade-
quately aligned by various contractual and market mechanisms. 63 A complete
statement of the "neo-classical" theory of the firm is unnecessary for this
Article, but a brief summary of key concepts will tie this discussion of
corporate purpose and corporate governance back to the takeover issue.6
institutions as an effective counterpoise to management, it is not clear that they vote contrary
to management interests. For example, James E. Heard, Deputy Director of the Investors
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), recently testified on the results of an IRRC study which
found that many fiduciaries are voting to approve management-sponsored defensive measures.
FED. SEC. L. REPORTS (CCH), No. 1173, April 16, 1986, p. 7 (testimony of James E. Heard
before Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance). Recently,
however, the Council of Institutional Investors, a coalition of pension funds, adopted a
shareholder "bill of rights" for the purpose of reasserting the role of investors in corporate
decisionmaking and making corporate management more accountable to shareholders, especially
in takeovers. Vise, "Bill of Rights" Seeks to Boost Power of Shareholders, Wash. Post, April
13, 1986, at Fl. Also, T. Boone Pickens, Jr., a frequent bidder for corporations, has proposed
the establishment of a non-profit organization to advocate shareholder interests. Victor, Pickens'
Plan Gets Mixed Reviews From Bar, The Nat'l L. J., Aug. 11, 1986, at 9.
59. The ability of a corporation's board of directors to terminate derivative litigation
greatly limits its present effectiveness as a constraint on managerial behavior. See, e.g., Edwards,
Compelled Termination and Corporate Governance: The Big Picture, 10 J. CORP. L. 373 (1985);
Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: Evaluation and a Proposal for
Legislative Reform, 81 CoLuM. L. REv. 261 (1981).
60. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663
(1974). For thoughts about federal influence on corporate goverance of an earlier advocate of
federal chartering see Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 545
(1984).
61. Brudney, supra note 38, at 1434 n.80; Buxbaum, supra note 37.
62. Brudney, supra note 38, at 1434 n.80; Buxbaum, supra note 37.
63. Professor Hetherington, for example, considers Berle and Means' view of the corpo-
ration to be obsolete: "A new theory has arisen to challenge the orthodoxy of the Berle and
Means view of the structure and goals of corporation law. This new theory ... asserts that
existing corporate arrangements should be viewed as a network of exchange transactions by
which participants-managers, shareholders, and others-seek to enhance their various interests
and that a theory of corporation law should be predicated on an empirically based understanding
of those relationships." Hetherington, supra note 32, at 248. Professor Hetherington finds it
"incredible that Berle and Means assigned so little importance to the role of the market in
disciplining management." Id. at 236. For a contrasting "institutionalist" view of the relation-
ship between the corporate system and society, drawn from Alfred Chandler's work, see
Buxbaum, supra note 4, at 520-25.
64. This model of the firm is put forward by various financial economists. See Jensen &
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The separation of ownership and management described by Berle and
Means is not disputed in this theory. Such separation, however, means that
shareholders-who are regarded as "principals"-must incur "agency costs"
to monitor their "agents" (management) and assure fidelity to shareholder
interests. 65 Since these costs diminish the value of their investment, share-
holders seek to reduce them. The essential governance issue, then, is how to
lower these costs most economically. These theorists assert that a variety of
monitoring techniques66 (e.g., independent directors or audit committees)
and a variety of contractual devices may be utilized to align management
and investor interests. 67
Furthermore, various markets, such as the markets for capital and
management services, 6 but especially the market for corporate control, play
a vital role in reducing agency costs and assuring management loyalty. Many
now believe that the "market for corporate control," first fully described
by Dean Manne in 1965,69 is the chief means for providing management
accountability. 7° Since Manne believed that the price of a corporation's stock
reflects managerial efficiency, a low price means that investors consider
management to be inefficient in some manner.7 ' While this controversial
analysis has been stated in various ways, the following excerpt captures the
gist of the purported relationship among supposedly efficient capital markets,
stock price movements, and the governance implications of takeovers:
... corporate takeovers are beneficial exchanges of corporate control
that generally result in more efficient management of target re-
sources .... If incumbent managements perform poorly, share prices
will reflect this performance by falling below their highest potential
value. A profit opportunity then exists for a shrewd entrepreneur to
purchase the undervalued shares, replace the poor managers with
more competent ones, and reap the rewards .... 72
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. Fi. EcoN. 305 (1976); Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. PoL.
EcoN. 288 (1980); Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & EcoN.
301 (1983); Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 327
(1983). For a useful summary and evaluation of the essential elements of the theory, see Davis,
Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U.L.
REv. 1, 4-19 (1985).
65. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64, at 308-09, 312-13.
66. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64, at 308, 323-24; see Davis, supra note 64, at 5-6.
67. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 64, at 323-38.
68. See Fama, supra note 64, at 288 (discussing market for managers); Fischel, The
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1287-90 (1982).
69. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL. EcoN. 110 (1965).
British economist Robin Marris had advanced a similar theory shortly before Manne, but did
not believe with Manne that it effectively constrained management. DAVIDSON, supra note 2, at
304-05.
70. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
71. See Manne, supra note 69, at 113.
72. Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash
Tender Offers, 23 J. L. & ECON. 371, 380-81 (1980).
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The threat that a "shrewd entrepreneur"-i.e., the bidder in a takeover
attempt-will purchase a company's stock allegedly serves to discipline
management and curb actions unfavorable to investors. The result is a
"solution" to the governance problem described by Berle and Means that
requires no great legal reforms except prohibition of management resistance
to takeovers.
73
Professor Brudney has harshly criticized reliance on the contract-market
analysis of corporate governance as both an inaccurate description of the
investor-management relationship and as legitimizing the very insularity of
management that Berle and Means deplored. 74 Quite apart from the merits
of this criticism, however, what is notable about both the contract-market
approach and a more interventionary "rules" approach to better corporate
governance is that each undertakes to seek (or describe) solutions to the
problem of slackness in the management-inestor relationship. Certainly,
improving management loyalty to shareholder interests rather than to its
own is an important, perhaps the most important, component of effective
corporate governance. This concern is, nonetheless, considerably narrower
in scope than the lively mid-century discussion of whether management ought
to advance (only) shareholder interests.
The remainder of this Article deals with the question of whether that
broader issue should be revisited in light of developments in the takeover
field. Courts for the most part clearly have not closely scrutinized manage-
ment's takeover behavior. As a result, target companies have successfully
implemented a wide variety of takeover defenses to thwart the workings of
the market for corporate control and the desire of shareholders for stock
premiums. It is now equally clear, however, that recent cases appear to be
rejecting deference to management in favor of greater protection for share-
holders.
The Revlon decision is of particular interest because it is the first time
the Delaware Supreme Court has directly addressed the issue of whether, in
formulating takeover strategy, directors may consider noninvestor interests.
In doing so the Court has, albeit in the takeover rather than in the day to
day operational setting, unknowingly revived the broader question of man-
agement orientation so vigorously debated by Professors Berle and Dodd
and others, but then largely slighted in governance discussions of the
narrower management-investor relationship. That and other recent decisions
may represent a judicial movement toward requiring greater affirmative
allegiance to shareholder interests. Evaluated in the restricted context of
management-investor relations, such a trend might be viewed as commend-
able, and overdue, and finally laying to rest the legacy of Berle and Means.
73. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1201-03. Professor Brudney believes
that the call for intervention to prohibit management resistance or to prohibit application of
the business judgment rule to defensive measures reveals the "schizophrenia" of an otherwise
non-interventionary theory. Brudney, supra note 38, at 1432 n.74.
74. Brudney, supra note 38. See also Buxbaum, supra note 4, at 525-37.
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Nonetheless, growing concerns and evidence that takeovers and the manage-
ment responses they engender are not also favorable for other important
interests raise, as in mid-century, the issue of whether corporations should
be managed exclusively for shareholders, or whether corporations must
somehow behave to take account of other interests and, if so, how.
II. JuDicIL NOTIONS OF MANAGEMENT DUTY
A. Problems With the Business Judgment Rule;
the Incompleteness of its Judicial Reassessment
Although a central principle of economic orthodoxy is that management
should faithfully serve the interests of shareholders, there is a strong, though
obscured, strain of managerialism in corporate law. Management is not
simply the "agent" of shareholders; it has an independent obligation to
manage the company. 75 This notion is seen clearly in the traditionally lenient
judicial review of management decisions, including those involving takeover
measures.
Courts have not required directors to acquiesce in a takeover simply
because it may have offered a large premium to shareholders. 76 In fact, far
from acquiescing, management has been allowed to employ a variety of
potent measures to resist and defeat a takeover attempt. 77 On what basis do
courts allow such behavior if management's task is to serve shareholder
interests loyally, particularly when the available stock price evidence indicates
that takeovers benefit shareholders? One answer of course is that courts
generally have applied the business judgment rule in assessing management
behavior in takeovers, thereby greatly reducing the scope of judicial review
of the merits of management actions. 78 While formulated in various ways,
75. A corporation's business and affairs are managed under the "direction" of its board
of directors. The board, not the shareholders, elects officers to carry out the actual managing
functions. See, e.g., MODEL BuSINESS Copp. ACT §§ 8.01, 8.40-.41 (1984). Thus, corporations
are managed by persons who, while supposedly acting on behalf of shareholders, have a great
deal of freedom because they are not directly controlled by shareholders or, many would argue,
effectively controlled by the board itself. Obviously, management needs a certain latitude of
action and thus, as the Delaware Supreme Court has recognized, the difficulty lies in "structuring
the modern corporation in order to satisfy the twin objectives of managerial freedom of action
and responsibility to shareholders. . . ." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 n.4 (Del. 1984).
76. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 n.10 (Del. 1985).
77. See infra note 78.
78. See, e.g., Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Say. & Loan, 749 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1984);
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983);
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981);
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth,
Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D.
Md. 1982); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. I11. 1982); Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
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the business judgment rule under Delaware law is a "presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company." ' 79 Applied in the takeover setting,
the business judgment rule will prevent a court from interfering with defensive
measures as long as they were implemented without the primary purpose of
retaining control of the corporation in incumbent management. s0
Assuming courts are presented with evidence on the beneficial impact of
takeovers on shareholder wealth and fully appreciate their governance impli-
cations,8 ' continued application of the business judgment rule can only reflect
a judicial belief that potential losses to shareholders do not outweigh the
rationale for the rule. One important reason for the business judgment rule
is that management, not shareholders or judges, manage corporations. That
rationale, however, does not deal with the critical questions of who are the
proper constituents of managerial efforts, and what exactly is the content of
management's duty to them at various stages before and during a takeover.
Application of the business judgment rule to the point of allowing manage-
ment to consistently thwart high premium takeover attempts must mean, in
effect, that courts do not identify the best interests of the "corporation"
with the interest of shareholders in obtaining tender offer premiums. That
does not stem, however, from a strongly held conviction that management
is the steward of many interests, but from a failure to ask the right question:
Beyond vague references to the "corporation," whose interest exactly is
management supposed to serve in a takeover?
Judicial dissatisfaction with the business judgment rule in takeover
settings first appeared in dissenting opinions. 82 It was only in 1984, however,
(Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 626-27 (Del. 1984).
Application of the business judgment rule to defensive measures has been widely criticized.
See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18; Gilson, supra note 9; Gelfond & Sebastian,
Re-Evaluating the Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REv.
403 (1980); Comment, The Misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule in Contests for
Corporate Control, 76 Nw. U. L. REy. 980 (1982).
79. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
80. In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court appeared to incorporate the "primary
purpose" test into the business judgment rule. Historically, however, that was a separate test.
See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). Unlike the business judgment rule's
presumption of propriety, however, the "primary purpose" test requires directors to prove that
they acted to serve some "corporate" purpose other than retention of control. Concerned about
the inherent conflict of interest faced by directors in formulating takeover responses, the court
in Unocal did not simply presume the propriety of the defensive measure, but required the
directors to prove the existence of reasonable grounds for believing that a takeover endangered
corporate policy or effectiveness. 493 A.2d at 955. That burden is satisfied by showing "good
faith and reasonable investigation. . . ." Id.
81. The Chancery Court was presented with such evidence in Moran v. Household
International Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1067-68 (Del. Ch. 1985). Judge Posner was also well aware
of the literature on the shareholder wealth effects of takeover activity in Dynamics Corp. of
America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3233 (1986).
82. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980) (Judge Rosenn, dissenting); Panter
v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981) (Judge Cudahy, dissenting).
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that court opinions began to show an appreciation of the full governance
implications of takeovers, seeing them not simply as another "corporate"
problem for management to contend with but as an opportunity for share-
holders to assert their influence and to impose their preferences on manage-
ment.
In Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace, Inc.,83 target management issued
sufficient common and preferred stock to its wholly owned Panamanian
subsidiary and to a newly created Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP)
to enable management to retain voting control of the corporation. In an
action seeking a preliminary injunction against voting the newly issued shares,
the Second Circuit found that the circumstances of the defensive measures
raised a "strong inference" that the purpose of the transaction was "not to
benefit the employees [as claimed by management] but rather to solidify
management's control of the company."' ' The court was especially concerned
that defensive actions not change the fundamental governance structure of a
corporation:
Our most important duty is to protect the fundamental structure
of corporate governance. While the day-to-day affairs of a company
are to be managed by its officers under the supervision of directors,
decisions affecting a corporation's ultimate destiny are for the
shareholders to make in accordance with democratic procedures.
85
The court resolved the propriety of issuing stock to a wholly owned
subsidiary by looking to applicable statutory law, but turned to common law
fiduciary principles to decide the legality of issuing stock to the ESOP. Since
the board's action appeared to be motivated largely by self-interest rather
than by other "corporate" purposes, the court declined to apply the business
judgment rule and stated that "the duty of loyalty requires the board to
demonstrate that any actions it does take are fair and reasonable.' '86 The
board having failed in that showing, the court upheld the granting of an
injunction.
Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc.87 involved the validity under New
Jersey law of various "scorched earth" tactics and a "poison pill" stock
rights plan implemented immediately before a hostile tender offer. Being
troubled, as was the court in Norlin, by the governance implications of
management's defensive maneuvers, the Court questioned whether the busi-
ness judgment rule should even be applied in takeovers. 8 The court expressed
83. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
84. Id. at 265.
85. Id. at 258.
86. Id. at 266. Compare Danaher Corporation v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., [1985-86
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RPTR. (CCH) 92,556 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (management met burden
of proving that establishment and funding of ESOP was not motivated by desire to maintain
control).
87. 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.N.Y. 1985).
88. Id. at 1259.
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the view that the decision to sell stock is a "private transaction" and an
"independent right of alienation" in which the board's effort to act as a
' "surrogate" for the shareholders was "troublesome." 9 The Minstar court's
holding did not require it to confront squarely the issue of judicial deference
to management action having such significant governance overtones. None-
theless, its concern about delineating the respective provinces of shareholders
and directors clearly underlay the court's decision to strike down the "poison
pill" rights plan under state law because, in several ways, the plan improperly
infringed on stockholder rights.90 Furthermore, relying on Norlin as authority
for requiring the target board to prove the fairness of defensive measures
apparently motivated by management self-interest rather than by other
"corporate" purposes, the court in Minstar also held that management had
failed to meet that burden with respect to the "scorched earth" tactics.
While these decisions clearly show a more critical judicial attitude toward
management's defensive measures, the problem with them, and with much
criticism of the business judgment rule in the takeover context, is that they
do not address the underlying issue of whether management has an affirm-
ative and overriding duty to shareholders to procure a premium for their
stock-i.e., to maximize shareholder wealth as measured by stock prices to
use the economists' phrase. Instead, these courts have sought only to remove
from defensive actions the taint of management self-interest. When manage-
ment can plausibly advance some "corporate" rather than selfish reason for
its behavior, courts will uphold the measures. That, however, is quite a
different matter than affirmatively requiring management to advance only
the interests of investors. If investors truly are the chief constituency of
corporate management, justifying defensive measures as free of self-interest
and as being in the best interests of the "corporation"-rather than the
shareholders-seems irrelevant. Advocates of shareholder interests might
insist that, as primary beneficiaries of corporate behavior, shareholders are
entitled to more from management than the absence of self-interest. They
might argue that shareholders are entitled to that conduct which best assures
them of the reasonably expected benefits of a tender offer or competing
offer-that is, behavior which maximizes value, but does not altogether defeat
the opportunity to sell. Even further, shareholder advocates might contend
that management has a duty to solicit bids or otherwise distribute value to
investors whenever it knows that for any extended period corporate assets
are significantly higher in value than corporate stock.
In short, such advocates might argue that management should at all
times pursue shareholder well-being, not simply by seeking long term profit
89. Id. at 1260 n.6.
90. See also Asarco Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D. N.J. 1985)
(poison pill issuance protected by business judgment rule, but violative of New Jersey prohibition
against different voting right within same class of stock unless approved by shareholders);
Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Industries, F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (poison pill that became
nonredeemable for ten years once triggered was violative of New Jersey law).
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maximization, but also by heeding short term preferences. 91 Prior to a
takeover attempt this focus would require management to dispose of assets
and to restructure the corporation voluntarily whenever doing so would place
more value in shareholder hands than the prevailing market value of their
stock. 92 Once a takeover attempt begins, such an orientation essentially
transforms management into a "bargaining agent" for shareholders whereby
it seeks that resolution-eventual capitulation, escape to a competing bidder,
or management buyout-that results in shareholders receiving the largest
possible premium.
Regrettably then, even courts critical of the business judgment rule have
failed to articulate the exact nature of the shareholders' claim on a corpo-
ration in or expecting a hostile takeover, contenting themselves with the
requirement that management not act out of self-interest. Specifically, courts
have failed to resolve whether, in addition to conscientious devotion to profit
maximization, shareholders may rightfully expect and insist that management
provide short term liquidity from the enterprise at top dollar. They have
also failed to precisely sort out the relative claims of investors and other
"corporate" interests in a takeover, interests which may conflict rather than
coincide with those of investors. 93 Until Revlon this failure continued not-
withstanding a line of decisions stating that noninvestor considerations are a
legitimate basis for management resistance to takeovers.
B. Noninvestor Interests in Pre-Revlon Decisions
While several Delaware decisions have held that it is improper for
directors to use corporate funds for the purpose of preserving control in
91. This is an example of the possible "tension" between long term profit maximization
and shareholder gain that § 2.01 of the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance does not
resolve. See supra note 23. Most economists apparently prefer a focus on shareholder gain. Id.
The law, however, is currently not that precise in its requirements.
92. A corporation's failure to correct a perceived imbalance between the value of its assets
and its stock may make the corporation vulnerable to bidders who essentially "arbitrage" the
discrepancy by buying companies in the stock market and selling them in the asset market.
Moreover, recent efforts by corporate management to "decompose" their entities may reflect
an effort to satisfy their shareholders while beating potential bidders to the punch. See infra
Section B of Part III.
93. Courts have not adequately dealt with the differing investment objectives of various
investors. Roughly speaking, there are "short-term" investors-epitomized by arbitrageurs-
and "long-term" investors. See W. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
84-85 (1965) ("[Tihe body of stockholders constitutes no homogeneous group and if one
attempts to determine what promotes the welfare of 'the stockholder' one runs into just the
same sort of difficulties as when one undertakes to measure the welfare of society."). Shorter
term investors acting collectively can always impose their assessment of the firm and its policies
on longer term investors simply by selling their stock to a bidder who will change corporate
policy in a manner that longer term investors may dislike. To this concern it might be responded
that "the standard assumption in corporate finance theory is that management should seek to
maximize the value of the corporation shares, since this will necessarily involve the appropriate
tradeoff that shareholders desire between long and short-term profit maximization." Coffee,
supra note 3, at 1154 n.18. Whether such value maximizing behavior in operating decisions can




themselves, 94 later decisions make it clear that share repurchases undertaken
to prevent takeovers that threaten the corporate entity or its business policy
are proper. 9 Thus, in Kors v. Carey the "corporate" interest to be protected
was the preservation of established relationships with customers which the
directors believed would be damaged, to the detriment of the enterprise, if
the dissident gained control. In Cheff v. Mathes, a dissident's likely change
in sales policies and employee unrest constituted sufficient threat to the
"corporate" interest to meet the directors' burden. More recently, in Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme Court continued to
refrain from identifying "corporate" and "shareholder" interests when it
stated that the board had a "fundamental duty and obligation to protect the
corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders,. .- 96 The court further
stated that in analyzing the effect of a takeover bid on the "corporate"
enterprise directors may consider, among other matters, the impact on
"creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community gener-
ally."
'97
Other decisions have cited possible harm to various noninvestor interests
in either providing injunctive relief from takeover attempts or upholding
defensive measures. Among such interests were employee morale98 and even
the public interest. 9 One of the most direct statements on the place of
noninvestors in corporate decisionmaking was made by the Tenth Circuit in
holding that the directors of the corporation owning the Denver Post had
acted properly in taking certain challenged actions:
We are fully cognizant of the well established corporate rule of law
which places corporate officers and directors in the position of
94. Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. 1962); Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17
A.2d 309 (Del. 1941); Macht v. Merchants Mortgage and Credit Co., 22 Del. Ch. 70, 194 A.23
(Del. Ch. 1937).
95. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch.
47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. 1977). Directors have the
burden of proving that the repurchases were in the "corporate" interest. See infra note 80.
Share repurchases at a price that gives the bidder a substantial profit on the transaction are
now referred to as "greenmail." For discussions of greenmail see Macey & McChesney, A
Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L. J. 13 (1985); Note, Greenmail:
Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management-Entrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REv.
1045 (1985).
96. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (upholding
discriminatory self-tender). Effective July, 1986, amended SEC Rule 13e-4(f) requires that an
issuer's offer to repurchase its stock must be open to all holders of the class of securities subject
to the offer. FED. SEC. L. RPR. (CCH), No. 1186, July 16, 1986, Pt. It. The effect is to
change the Unocal outcome for issuers subject to the rule.
97. Unocal, 492 A.2d at 955.
98. F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc. 597 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1979);
Boyes Form Burial Casket Co. v. Amedco, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Abramson
v. Nytronics, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See Enterra Corp. v. SGS Associates,
600 F. Supp. 678, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (refusal to enjoin stands still agreement because of
stability it provided to corporation in its relations with employees and other noninvestors).
99. Grummon Corp. v. LTV Corp., 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981).
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fiduciaries for the stockholders. Basic in that rule of law is the profit
motive of the corporate entity. In this case we have a corporation
engaged chiefly in the publication of a large metropolitan newspaper,
whose obligation and duty is something more than the making of
corporate profits. Its obligation is threefold: to the stockholders, to
the employees, and to the public."00
More recently, a federal district court made much the same kind of
statement in an almost classic expression of the view that directors are
equipped to, and should, mediate the interests of various constituencies:
The exercise of independent, honest business judgment of an enlight-
ened and disinterested Board is the traditional and appropriate way
to deal fairly and evenhandedly with both the protection of investors,
on the one hand, and the legitimate concerns and interests of
employees and management of a corporation who service the interests
of investors, on the other.' °'
However apparently clear the language in these opinions, there is a
danger of making too much of these decisions as authority for the proposition
that management either owes a duty to or may on other grounds consider
noninvestor interests in takeovers. Most statements about noninvestor inter-
ests are dicta and unnecessary for resolving the issues presented. Furthermore,
given the posture of the cases, it is not at all clear that shareholders were
denied an opportunity to tender or were otherwise damaged. Moreover, the
statements were made less to highlight the claim of various noninvestors on
the corporation than to emphasize the variety of factors that management,
in its wide discretion, may consider in formulating takeover responses.
0 2
Thus, at one level these decisions might be viewed as simply respecting
management's judgment that the takeover attempt should be resisted because
it was not in the "long run" interests of shareholders. As such, management's
concerns for "corporate policy" and various noninvestor interests are but
intermediate concerns, important only for their contribution to the eventual
well being of shareholders.103 Yet, by implicitly seeking to reconcile interests
in this manner, the courts fail to answer why shareholders should not be
entitled to elect an immediate stock premium over longer run profit for the
100. Harold Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1091 (10th Cir. 1972).
101. GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1020
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
102. While corporate management "may" consider noninvestor interests, it is certainly not
obligated to do so. See Local 1330 United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d
1264, 1279-82 (6th Cir. 1980) (corporation has no duty to consider effects on employees or
communities in plant closing decision).
103. The court in Union Carbide stated that the Union Carbide board's duty was "solely
to the welfare of Carbide's investors and to deal with the interests of Carbide's employees and
management fairly, in furtherance of those interests of investors." Union Carbide, 624 F. Supp.
at 1019. This statement seems to imply that the interests of management and employees are of
significance only in that they further investor interests.
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entity. Nor do they deal with takeovers as perhaps the only viable means for
shareholders to express displeasure with management's long-term operating
decisions. Instead, while these decisions might be woven into the orthodox
view that corporations are to be operated for the ultimate good of share-
holders, they permit the time frame for realizing benefits to be determined
not by shareholders but by management in the exercise of its broad discretion.
The result is that preservation of management prerogative rather than any
particular protection for investor or noninvestor interests is the striking
outcome of these decisions.
These pre-Revlon decisions then suffer from the same fundamental flaw
as Norlin and Minstar. They fail to resolve the issue of whether a majority
of shareholders should have the right to elect an immediate substantial
premium-whatever the implications of that preference for other sharehold-
ers, the entity itself, and entity-dependent noninvestors-rather than receive
value from the corporation over the longer term. Using the language of §
2.01 of the Principles of Corporate Governance, these decisions fail to
distinguish a corporation's objective to enhance "corporate profit" from its
objective to increase "shareholder gain." Nor do any of these decisions shed
light on the even harder issue of whether directors, far from simply not
interfering with unsolicited offers out of self interest, ought affirmatively to
seek higher immediate returns for shareholders either through "auctioning"
the company, distributing value via stock repurchases, or other corporate
restructuring. While difficult questions of value-maximizing tactics and how
to judicially review such tactics open once the board of directors is narrowly
conceived as essentially a "bargaining agent" for shareholders,'14 those
questions can be confronted only when courts squarely acknowledge that it
is shareholder wealth maximization over their chosen time horizon-and no
other interests-that directors are to serve. Prior to Revlon that had not
happened.
C. Solicitude for Shareholders in Revlon and
Other Recent Decisions
In Revlon the Supreme Court of Delaware stated that it was addressing
for the first time the "extent to which a corporation may consider the impact
104. Professors Easterbrook and Fischel contend that management of the target company
should take no action to resist a takeover attempt. See Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 18.
Others, however, argue that management should elicit competing bids and, in effect, "auction"
the corporation on behalf of the shareholders at the highest price. See, e.g., Gilson, Seeking
Competitive Bids versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982);
Weiss, supra note 9, at 26-32; Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal
for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 322-23 (1983); Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating
Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL
L. REV. 53, 83-94 (1985). See also Matheson and Norberg, supra note 25. Notwithstanding such
commentary, pre-Revlon courts in effect allowed management to select entity survival and profit
rather than shareholder gain as its focus.
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of a takeover threat on constituencies other than shareholders."'' 0 While
complex, the essential facts are as follows: MacAndrews and Forbes ("M
and F") made an offer to purchase Revlon that the Revlon Board rejected.
The Board then adopted a "poison pill" rights plan somewhat similar to
that upheld in Moran v. Household International, Inc.106 M and F then
offered $47.50 per share for all of Revlon's shares, subject to procuring
financing and redemption of the rights. Revlon responded with an offer to
exchange notes and preferred stock for 26% of its outstanding stock. The
notes contained covenants limiting the amount of additional debt that could
be incurred by the company, thereby aiming to thwart M and F's proposed
financing plan.
M and F responded to the exchange offer by first reducing its offer to
$42 per share, but then increasing it to $50 and then $53, conditioned again
on redemption of the rights. The Revlon board then entered a leveraged
buy-out agreement, with Forstriann, Little & Co. and certain members of
management, for $56 per share. M and F then raised its bid to $56.25 and
announced that it would engage in "fractional bidding" to defeat any other
offer for Revlon. Forstmann then offered $57.25 for Revlon, conditioned
on obtaining a lock-up option on two substantial divisions of Revlon, a no-
shop provision, and a $25 million "break-up" fee. In addition, Forstmann
agreed to support the market value of the notes that Revlon had issued in
its exchange offer and which had declined in value. The Revlon Board
accepted this offer.
M and F then raised its offer to $58 and sued to enjoin the lock-up
option and break-up fee. The Chancery Court issued an injunction and the
Supreme Court affirmed. In invalidating the lock-up option, the court stated
that since the Revlon Board had acknowledged the company was for sale,
its duty had changed from preserving Revlon as a corporate entity to the
more limited function of serving as "auctioneer" of the company at the best
price for shareholders. 0 7 As such, it was improper to enter the arrangement
with Forstmann out of concern for the noteholders.
The court began its analysis by stating that the business judgment rule
protects those decisions by directors as are in the best interests of the
"company."' ' 0 The court also stated the common, but fuzzy, notion that
directors owe fiduciary duties to the "corporation and its shareholders,' °9
a phrase that appears throughout Delaware decisions." 0 The court considered
105. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986).
106. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
107. Id. at 182.
108. Id. at 180.
109. Id. at 179.
110. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Super. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). The reason for stating that a director is a fiduciary for
the "corporation and its shareholders" is that in director loyalty cases--e.g., self-dealing-
where the phrase originates the interests of the corporate entity and of shareholders were
aligned. If directors favored themselves in such a transaction, that damaged both the corporate
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implementation of the rights plan to be valid since it was in the best
"corporate" interests and, because it "spurred the bidding to new heights,"
in the best interests of shareholders as well."'
Only as the court addressed the lock-up option did it recognize the need
to clarify and distinguish the duty to "shareholders" from the duty to
"corporation." In doing so, the court spoke of a "change" in the duty so
that obtaining the maximum price for shareholders is the directors' sole
concern when the company is for sale." 2 As such, solicitude for noninvestor
interests or preserving the "corporate" enterprise is no longer appropriate.
The remainder of the opinion goes on to discuss defensive measures solely
in terms of how they affect shareholder well being, concluding that the lock-
up option was invalid since it ended the auction of the company to the
detriment of shareholders.'
The important question is whether courts will confine the idea of a
"change" in directors' duties to the Revlon facts or whether Revlon marks
the beginning of an effort to articulate more clearly director takeover duties
generally by distinguishing shareholder from "corporate" interests and re-
quiring greater fidelity to the former. In short, are there reasons to believe
that courts will require directors to advance shareholder rather than "cor-
porate" well being in all facets of takeovers?"
'4
There are several reasons for believing that courts increasingly will review
defensive measures for their distinct impact on shareholders. First, the nature
of the duty to shareholders in takeovers needs clarification rather than
leaving it buried in the phrase "corporation and its shareholders." This
clarification requires an evaluation of the shareholders' claim on the corpo-
ration, assessing its status in relation to other demands on corporate activity
entity and, derivatively, the shareholders. Certainly, as in classic self-dealing cases, the law must
be vigilant that management not simply favor its own interests in takeovers. Beyond that,
however, the line-up of other interests in takeovers may be different. "Corporate" interests,
unless wholly identified with those of investors, may be aligned with rather than opposed to
those of directors who seek the preservation of the entity and its constituent relationships. Thus,
to continue using the phrase "corporation and its shareholders" to describe management's
fiduciary duty is of little use in takeovers. This is the same "tension" in decisional law between
entity well being and shareholder gain as exists in § 2.01 of the Principles of Corporate
Governance. See infra note 23. Codifications of director duty such as § 4.01 of the Principles
of Corporate Governance and § 8.30 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, by simply
stating that a director is to act in the best interests of the "corporation," also provide no
guidance in takeovers.
I 1I. 506 A.2d at 181. The court's opinion in Revlon is an example of the imprecision and
equivocation about whose interests directors are to protect in takeovers that was just noted. See
infra note 110 and accompanying text.
112. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
113. Id. at 184-185.
114. Already the Sixth Circuit has adopted Revlon's auctioning concept in holding that a
target board of directors breached its fiduciary duty to shareholders in approving a management
buy-out that effectively ended the bidding process. Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., [Current] FED.
SEC. L. RPTR. (CCH) 92,863 (6th Cir. 1986). As in Revlon, however, directors had conceded
that the corporation would be sold. Id.
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at various stages of a takeover. Are shareholders entitled to more than
management devotion to long term profit maximization, deserving opportun-
ities at premiums as well? If so, why limit this to instances where directors
acknowledge the break-up of the company instead of requiring value maxi-
mizing behavior, if not at all times, at least from the point an unsolicited
offer is made? If directors are to serve as the faithful "agents" of share-
holders there is no logical reason to assign them that role only when they
subjectively concede break-up. As this line of reasoning is pushed, it is
readily apparent that envisioning management as shareholder "agent" may
be narrowing and troubling."' Nonetheless, since courts have shown an
inclination to scrutinize management behavior, these hard issues should not
be ducked.
Second, the court in Revlon stated a principle that it may have intended
for general application: "A board may have regard for various constituencies
in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits
accruing to the stockholders."" 6 This element of the business judgment rule,
originating in Unocal, may require directors to demonstrate, even prior to
the inevitability of a "break-up," that defensive measures lead to specific
benefits for shareholders rather than simply being in the best interests of the
"corporation." Whether "benefits" will be interpreted to mean an oppor-
tunity to realize immediate takeover-generated premiums as maximized by
management efforts or as simply meaning the opportunity to remain an
investor in the company as presently operated and over the "long run" is
not clear.
Support for the interpretation that "benefits" means an opportunity for
a premium is found in the court's discussion of the rights plan, a discussion
that sheds light on the earlier Moran decision." 7 The Revlon court considered
the rights plan to be valid since it "protected the shareholders" from a
takeover attempt at a price below the company's "intrinsic value."" 8 The
plan did so by encouraging bidding that drove the offered price to new
heights, an outcome the court considered "a proper result of its implemen-
tation. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354, 1356-67."119 The intent may have been
to strictly limit Moran to a holding on the validity, not the later utilization
of the poison pill, a reading consistent with the last few sentences of that
opinion.2 0 That measure is thus defensible as reasonably related to share-
115. The troubling notion of management as "agent" is a different kind of concern about
the agency model of management than that expressed by Professor Brudney. See supra note
38. The concern here is not the descriptive deficiencies of such a model, but the ramifications
for the corporate institution if indeed courts come to view target management as essentially a
bargaining agent for shareholders in takeovers.
116. 506 A.2d at 182 (emphasis added).
117. Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
118. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181.
119. Id.
120. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357. In what may have been an attempt to blunt the expected
adverse reaction to its opinion, the court in Moran emphasized that it was sanctioning only the
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holder "benefit" because it can be expected to result in higher bids for
shareholders' stock. Should directors utilize the plan for some other end-
for example, the protection of noninvestor interests-by absolutely refusing
to redeem the rights in the face of a high premium offer, they undoubtedly
will be called on to justify that action as "reasonably related" to shareholder
rather than simply "corporate" well being.' 2' Thus, while the Revlon court
did not expressly define "benefit" in terms of a shareholder's right to receive
bids, striking down the lock-up option and upholding the rights plan because
of their impact on the bidding process may carry that meaning.
Third, reviewing defensive measures for their impact on the bidding
process provides a kind of standard of propriety, a standard that is absent
when judges review operating decisions. Simply put, since "[m]arket forces
must be allowed to operate freely to bring the target's shareholders the best
price available,"'' 22 actions which inhibit this, as the lock-up option did in
Revlon, are improper, while actions that enhance this, as the redeemable
poison pill did in Revlon, are proper. Such a judicial perspective would defer
less readily to management's defense of such actions as in the best interests
of the "company" and would require proof that the actions benefited
shareholders. Shareholder benefit, however, would not be confined to "long-
run" interests, but if market forces are to operate fully, must include the
interest in obtaining all available benefits of the market, including a market
for corporate control that offers stock premiums and presents shareholders
with the opportunity to make basic decisions on the corporation's fate.
Evaluating defensive measures in terms of their effect on the bidding process
will not always be easy, but it may be an appealing benchmark for courts
struggling to reconcile management duty and shareholder rights.12
initial implementation of a "poison pill" rights plan, not the manner in which it was ultimately
employed: "While we conclude for present purposes that the Household Directors are protected
by the business judgment rule, that does not end the matter. The ultimate response to an actual
takeover bid must be judged by the Directors' actions at the time, and nothing we say here
relieves them of their basic fundamental duties to the corporation and its stockholders....
Their use of the Plan will be evaluated when and if the issue arises." Id.
121. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354. In Moran, the court emphasized that a board of directors
"faced with a tender offer and a request to redeem the Rights .... will not be able to arbitrarily
reject the offer." Id. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 ("A corporation does not have unbridled
discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any Draconican means available."). The Revlon
court imposes a stricter test for defensive measures than these "arbitrary" and "unbridled
discretion" standards. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
122. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184. The court in Revlon once again, as in Unocal, rejected the
"passivity" thesis of Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 18, and stated that the "directors
role remains an active one, changed only in the respect that they are charged with the duty of
selling the company at the highest price attainable for the stockholders' benefit." Revlon, 506
A.2d at 184 n.16.
123. The difficulty of evaluating defensive measures in terms of their effect on the bidding
process is made clear by Judge Guy's dissenting opinion in Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp.,
[Current] FED. SEc. L. RPTR. (CCH) 92,863 (6th Cir. 1986). Judge Guy pointed out that no
shareholders objected to the resistance and that continued resistance required "an evaluation
of the upside benefit of getting perhaps a dollar more per share versus the downside benefit
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Finally, emphasis on director duty to shareholders rather than to "com-
pany" is increasingly prominent in decisions. The last portion of the Revlon
opinion abandons the customary "corporation and its shareholders" phrase
and refers only to the duty to shareholders. 2 Shareholder participation in
corporate governance clearly was of concern to the Norlin and Minstar
courts, however incomplete the courts' analyses. 125 Recently, the Sixth,
Second and Seventh Circuits, in striking down a management buy-out, 26 a
lock-up option'27 and a poison pill rights plan,'1 respectively, expressed
concern for the effect of these defensive measures on shareholder well being.
The Sixth Circuit made it clear that in reviewing the propriety of a manage-
ment buy-out which sought to end a takeover attempt, the court's function
was to determine whether the target corporation's directors had fulfilled their
fiduciary duty to shareholders to obtain the highest premium for their
stock. '9 The Second Circuit considered the challenged lock-up option to
affect shareholders adversely by both dampening the bidding process and
impinging on governance rights. 30 The court stated that a director's obliga-
tion is "to protect the financial interests of the corporation, and thereby the
shareholders.... When engaging in defensive maneuvers, ... a director's
obligation is to ensure the overall fairness . . . to the shareholders."' 3'
Judge Posner, in striking down a target company's poison pill, was even
clearer in expressing the duty of directors as running to the shareholders:
It is supposed to be the shareholders' company, for it is they who
are entitled to all the income that the company generates after paying
off all contractually or otherwise obligated expenses. The officers
and directors are the agents and fiduciaries of the shareholders and
owe a duty of complete loyalty which is inconsistent with erecting
insuperable barriers to hostile takeovers. 32
Judge Posner's opinion refers only to director duty to shareholders, and
avoids altogether the confusing "corporation and its shareholders" language.
He summarizes the various arguments for and against defensive measures in
terms of their effect on shareholder wealth, citing Jarrell's study that some
resistance is wealth maximizing provided the bidder is not ultimately driven
of possibly losing the white night in the process." Id. at 94,216. If courts require premium-
maximizing behavior they may have to refine their analysis to respond to Judge Guy's legitimate
concern.
124. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes S3-90 and accompanying text.
126. Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., [Current] FED. Sac. L. RP'rR. (CCH) 92,863 (6TH Cm.
1986).
127. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SECM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
128. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986).
129. Edelman, CCH 92,863 at 94,212, 94,214.
130. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 281.
131. Id. at 277-78.
132. Dynamics Corp., 794 F.2d at 254.
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away."' In the end, however, Judge Posner appears unwilling to evaluate
defensive measures solely by the standard of shareholder wealth. Instead,
given the present lack of conclusive evidence on the wealth effects of
defensive measures, Judge Posner's chief concern is that defensive measures
render shareholders vulnerable to their own management, thereby nullifying
the important governance protection provided to shareholders by the market
for corporate controlJM
It is too early to know whether, after years of deference, courts truly
will move toward requiring management at all stages of a takeover to respond
in a manner that better serves shareholder interests2" If they do, the market
for corporate control may indeed be the engine of enhanced managerial
accountability to shareholders, thereby apparently rectifying a longstanding
problem of corporate governance. Yet, should the law finally join economic
orthodoxy in placing investors at the center of the corporate stage, it seems
proper to ask whether this triumph bodes well for other interests.
III. THE RESULTS oF TAKEOVER AcTrvrrY
There is considerable evidence that shareholders of target companies
profit from corporate takeovers." 6 If stricter judicial review of defensive
133. Id. at 255.
134. Id. at 255-58. See R. PosNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 303-05 (2d ed. 1977).
135. Many takeover participants see a clear indication of heightened judicial solicitude for
target shareholders. Stewart and Hertzberg, Life Becomes Easier for Corporate Raiders, Wall
St. J., Aug. 22, 1986 at 6. It is possible, however, that the Delaware Supreme Court will pull
back from Revlon and veer off in a more management-oriented direction, a pattern in recent
years. Compare Zapata Corp. v. Madanado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) and Singer v. Magnavox
Co., 380 A,2d 969 (Del. 1977) with Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) and Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
If courts do scrutinize defensive measures more closely, one practical consequence will be
that directors will fashion takeover responses that minimize their legal exposure to disgruntled
shareholders. Currently, many companies cannot obtain directors' and officers' liability coverage
at affordable rates. Ailing D&O Insurance Market Looks for Cure, 6 Tim Bus. LAW. UPDATE,
(March-April, 1986) 1. Those that can purchase insurance encounter limits on the amount of
coverage and discover that protection from takeover activity is excluded altogether in many
policies. Id. Unless and until this problem is resolved, there may be little incentive for directors-
particularly outside directors-to do anything but respond to a hostile takeover attempt in a
way that appeases shareholders while providing management a relatively advantageous outcome.
136. See generally Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific
Evidence, 11 J. OF FiN. EcoN. 5 (1983); Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, 62 HAv.
Bus. REv. 109 (Nov.-Dec. 1984); Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do
Interests Diverge in a Merge?, 28 J. L. & EcoN. 151 (1985). While shareholders of target
companies experience dramatic wealth gains from takeovers, it is less clear that shareholders of
acquiring corporations also benefit. A study of 78 mergers and takeovers in the period 1976
through 1981 found that, three years after consummation, the price of the acquiror's stock was
much lower than if it had simply continued its preacquisition performance. Magenheim &
Mueller, On Measuring 1he Effect of Acquisitions on Acquiring Firm Shareholders (Nov., 1985)
(unpublished manuscript) (copy on file at Washington & Lee Law Review office). Furthermore,
the studies of target stock performance tend to observe a period fairly close in time to the
tender offer. There appears to be "no authoritative study . . . as to whether, in the long run,
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measures and management-initiated responses aimed at "preempting" take-
overs continue, shareholders will realize even greater benefits.
Notwithstanding these gains, since corporations are important social and
economic institutions, 37 many in society expect them to serve interests other
than just those of capital providers. One of the major issues in the takeover
debate is whether high levels of such activity serve or damage noninvestor
interests. There simply is no authoritative evidence that enables this assess-
ment to be made. As a result, it is not conclusively known whether the
wealth and governance benefits to shareholders "offset" by some calculus
any costs to other interests, or even whether takeover gains to certain
noninvestors are greater than losses to others.
If, however, one believes that corporations should be managed to
promote shareholder interests, then the salutary effects of widespread take-
over activity on shareholder well being are sufficient warrant for requiring
premium-maximizing behavior by management. Additional information on
how noninvestors fare, however important for public policy, is, in this view,
simply irrelevant to the issue of how management should behave toward
takeovers. Moreover, if stock prices are a "reliable barometer" of whether
takeovers are beneficial for society,3 8 then premium-producing takeovers
both enhance shareholder wealth and are good for society. As such, the
argument goes, we do know that takeovers serve, or at least are not
inconsistent with, the public good.
While the state of knowledge about the effects of takeovers on various
interests is still developing, currently there are two concerns that can be set
against the benefits to shareholders as one seeks some overall evaluation.
The first deals with the outcome of completed takeovers. Is the result of
takeover activity generally the ousting of inefficient management or other
"synergistic" gain, to the good of society's desire for an efficient use of
economic resources? Or is there credible evidence that, whatever may moti-
vate takeover activity, the end result is not the singular attainment of more
efficient enterprises? The second concern relates to the potential costs to
noninvestor interests as prospective target companies seek to "pre-empt"
tender offers have contributed to corporate viability or profitability or have benefited share-
holders." Goldberg, Regulation of Hostile Tender Offers: A Dissenting View and Recommended
Reforms, 43 MD. L. REv. 225, 228 (1984). See also, ADVISORY COMM. ON TENDER OFFERS, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS xvii (July 8, 1983) ("insufficient
basis for concluding that takeovers are either per se beneficial or detrimental to the economy
or the securities markets in general, or to issuers or their shareholders, specifically").
137. See infra note 10.
138. The 1985 Economic Report, supra note 14, at 197 states: "Stock market prices thereby
provide a reliable barometer of the likely consequences of takeover transactions. If the aggregate
net change in the value of an acquirors' and targets' shares is positive as a result of a takeover,
then the transaction creates wealth and is beneficial." It bears remembering, however, that an
acquisition which increases the wealth of both acquiring and target shareholders does not
necessarily improve society's welfare. There are costs that simply are not captured by the stock
price evidence. These result not only from such economic factors as an increase in monopoly
power, but also from less quantifiable social costs. See infra note 22.
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takeovers by placating shareholders with corporate restructurings and the
substitution of debt for equity.
A. Theory and Evidence on the Outcome of
Completed Takeovers
In the absence of direct evidence on how various interests fare in
takeovers, the ability to reconcile shareholder interests with the collective
good depends on the contention that stock price increases in takeovers reflect
positive changes in societal as well as in shareholder welfare, societal welfare
being equated with enhanced efficiency in the use of economic resources.
The first step in this argument is to explain the theoretical relationship among
efficient capital markets, the considerable evidence on stock price movements
in takeovers, and the efficiency implications of takeovers:
In fact, the stock price change is the best measure of the
takeover's future impact on the organization. The vast scientific
evidence on the theory of efficient markets indicates that, in the
absence of inside information, a security's market price represents
the best available estimate of its true value. The evidence shows that
market prices incorporate all current public information about future
cash flows and the value of individual assets in an unbiased way.
Stock prices change, of course, in response to new information about
individual assets. Because market prices are efficient, however, the
new information is equally likely to cause them to decrease or
increase, after allowing for normal returns. Positive stock price
changes then indicate a rise in the total profitability of the merged
companies. Furthermore, because evidence indicates it does not come
from the acquisition of market power, this increased profitability
must be from the company's improved productivity.3 9
139. Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, HARV. Bus. REV. 109, 113 (Nov.-Dec. 1984).
Elsewhere, Professor Jensen has acknowledged some problems with the available stock price
evidence:
Several studies show indications of systematic reductions in the stock prices of bidding
firms in the year following the event. These post-outcome negative abnormal returns
are unsettling because they are inconsistent with market efficiency and suggest that
changes in stock price during takeovers overestimate the future efficiency gains from
mergers.... Explanation of these post-event negative abnormal returns is currently
an unsettled issue.
Jensen & Ruback, supra note 136, at 20-22. Magenheim and Mueller also found post-acquisition
declines in the bidders' stock. See Magenheim & Mueller, supra note 136. Furthermore, some
financial economists candidly acknowledge uncertainty as to the reasons for heightened takeover
activity, as made clear by Professor Michael Bradley in proceedings before the SEC:
I don't know exactly what's going on. That's the next level of study. What we do is,
we're going from the aggregate to the particular; that particular is going to require
numerous case studies, going in and finding out what is actually happening. And I
know there are a lot of us in this business who are trying to convince Ph.D. students
to take that as a line of inquiry, to get them to find out exactly what's happening in
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From there it is but a short step to an even bolder conclusion about
takeover benefits:
The available evidence, however, is that mergers and acquisitions
increase national wealth. They improve efficiency, transfer scarce
resources to higher valued uses, and stimulate effective corporate
management. They also help recapitalize firms so that their financial
structures are more in line with prevailing market conditions.
4
0
However attractive, this thesis immediately strikes one as at odds with
the realities of many takeovers. If takeovers are motivated by the pursuit of
"synergies" or the ousting of incompetent management, why do so many
bidders not revitalize the target but immediately dismember it?141 The answer
seems to be that nobody really knows exactly why takeovers take place or
what the sources of shareholder wealth gains are.' 42 The term "synergy" is
a conveniently vague, catchall term explaining nothing. In spite of this lack
of knowledge, however, some retain faith in the workings of the market for
corporate control, asserting that "fair competition among rival management
teams can prevent acquiring firms from effecting value-decreasing takeovers
and target managers from defeating value-increasing acquisitions."' 4 3
More direct evidence on the efficiency outcomes of many mergers casts
some doubt on such a confident assessment of corporate acquisitions.
Professor F.M. Scherer and Mr. David Ravenscraft have assembled substan-
tial direct evidence on mergers showing that acquired companies during the
1960's and early 1970's were, on average, highly profitable before being
acquired and that, after being acquired, often experienced a decline in
profitability.'" When tender offer acquisitions were isolated from their data,
these acquisitions .... The point is that it's taken us this time to get to this point in
the aggregate data, and that's exactly what we want to do, find out exactly where
those synergies are coming from.
SEC Economic Forum, supra note 14 at 65-66 (testimony of Professor Michael Bradley).
140. 1985 Economic Report, supra note 14, at 196.
141. Peter Drucker has suggested that inflation may play a role in takeovers by distorting
the relationship between asset and stock values. "In any inflation the cost of capital goods
tends to rise much faster than the price of the goods they produce. It thus becomes economical
to buy already existing capital assets rather than to invest in new facilities and new machines.
So any company that is rich in fixed assets is worth more when dismembered-that is, when its
capital assets are being sold as pieces of real estate, as factories, as machinery and equipment-
than it is worth on a realistic price/earnings ratio based on the value of its output. This is one
of the distortions which the raiders exploit." Drucker, Corporate Takeovers-What is to be
Done? THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1986, at 3, 6. In essence, Drucker is suggesting that bidders
do not utilize the acquired assets but seek to "arbitrage" the markets for corporate assets and
stock, buying stock simply to gain control over assets and then selling off the assets. See supra
note 92,
142. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 15, at 1410-11.
143. Id. at 1411.
144. D. Ravenscraft & F. M. Scherer, The Profitability of Mergers (Dec. 1985) (working
paper) (copy on file at Washington & Lee Law Review office). Using F.T.C. "Line of Business"
accounting profitability data between 1974 and 1977, Ravenscraft and Scherer compared lines
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similar outcomes were found.2 41 Scherer and Ravenscraft conclude that their
findings are "difficult to reconcile with the conjecture that mergers turned
out on average to be profit-increasing and efficiency-enhancing"'' 46 and
suggest that "the hypothesis that tender offer acquisitions are on average
efficiency-increasing warrants much more skepticism than it has received
thus far in the literatures of economics, corporate finance, and securities
law. 147
In another recent study, Professors Herman and Lowenstein, having
examined fifty-six hostile tender offers initiated between 1975 and 1983, also
found a significant decline in the acquired company's post-merger financial
performance, and concluded that hostile takeovers do not necessarily lead to
efficiency gains. 48 These studies, along with post-acquisition market share
declines observed by Professor Mueller, 49 raise substantial doubts as to
whether only inefficiently managed companies are acquisition targets or
whether there are always useful "synergies" in a takeover. They also raise a
serious question as to whether acquirors are serving larger societal interests
by "breaking up" or possibly mismanaging what may have been well-run
businesses.
Evidence of the type gathered by these recent studies undoubtedly will
be controversial and will spawn yet further studies. If supported, however,
such findings have potentially important implications for corporate gover-
nance. First, depressed stock prices that make an acquisition feasible may
not reflect a governance or efficiency "problem" that needs remedying, or
at least one that necessarily will be remedied through a change in corporate
control. Instead, many takeovers may be motivated by reasons having
nothing to do with utilizing corporate resources more efficiently. Second, if
the less efficient use of corporate resources is not a social good to be
encouraged, the claim that takeovers are uniformly good for shareholder
wealth, good for corporate governance, and good for society at large may
not be true. While takeovers undeniably are good for selling shareholders
of business that had substantial merger activity between 1950 and 1970 with lines that did not.
While the Ravenscraft-Scherer findings run counter to the claims of those who rely on stock
price evidence, they are in line with earlier work which also found few efficiency gains from
mergers. See, e.g., Hogarty, The Profitability of Corporate Mergers, 43 J. oF Bus. 317, 325-26
(1970). See generally, K. DAViDSON, supra note 2, at Ch. 15 (reviewing pre-1984 evidence).
145. D. Ravenscraft & F.M. Scherer, Life After Takeover (Sept, 1986) (working paper)
(copy on file at Washington & Lee Law Review office). Ravenscraft and Scherer found that
pre-takeover profitability of targets was only "slightly inferior" to that of industry peers.
146. Ravenscraft & Scherer, supra note 144, at 34.
147. Ravenscraft & Scherer, supra note 145, at 13.
148. Herman & Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers: An Empirical
Study (a study in proceedings of Columbia University's Center for Law and Economics Studies
Conference on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control) 19-26 (Nov. 1985) (copy on file
at Washington & Lee Law Review office).
149. Mueller, Mergers and Market Share, 67 REv. EcON. & STAT. 259 (1985) (substantial
1950-72 declines in market share experienced by acquired businesses as compared to control
group companies).
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who obtain premiums, they do not necessarily serve a commendable gover-
nance function, do not inevitably serve society's interest in moving resources
to more productive uses, and do not usefully serve local or other noninvestor
interests that may be adversely affected by the altered utilization of a
corporation's assets. As such, a pro-takeover stance rooted in the stock price
evidence may be unable to claim advancement of society's efficiency concerns
as a reason for requiring management essentially to auction the companies
they manage. Rather, such a position may have to rest more narrowly on
shareholder gain.
Investor gain may be sufficient justification of takeovers for those who
remain committed to the view that corporations should be managed for
capital providers. If it cannot also be claimed, however, that takeovers fairly
consistently eliminate rather than cause corporate waste and dislocation such
a view may rapidly lose many adherents.
B. The Effects of Threatened Takeovers
The impact of heightened takeover activity is felt not only by corpora-
tions actually taken over, but also by those whose managements expect or
fear a takeover. In fact, this is one of the supposed virtues of an active
market for corporate control.3 0 The risk of excessive deterrence, however,
has led numerous persons to criticize takeovers as causing a variety of
corporate ills. These ills essentially stem from possible "over-responsiveness"
by management to the demands of capital providers and include management
preoccupation with short run performance, a decline in product research and
development and innovation generally, too great a fear of corporate liquidity,
and a reduction in employee morale.'5 '
Such claims might be viewed as naturally suspect when made by those
with a great deal to lose in takeovers-management and its allies. Moreover,
such assertions are difficult to measure, and even if quantifiable, are not
conclusively attributable to the influence of takeovers. Nevertheless, respon-
sible persons have made these claims often enough that serious study should
be given to the effects of rampant takeover activity on the behavior of
threatened corporations. The task is not simply to discern prevalent trends
in corporate activity, but to isolate persuasively the role of the takeover
threat in those trends.
150. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 1174. Professors Easterbrook & Fischel
argued that the threat of takeover causes managers "to reduce agency costs in order to reduce
the chance of takeover, and the process of reducing agency costs leads to higher prices for
shares." Id.
151. Drucker, supra note 140, at 12-14; Drucker, A Crisis of Capitalism, Wall St. J., Sept.
30, 1986, at 32; Fogg, Takeovers: Last Chance for Self-Restraint, 63 HARv. Bus. REv. 30
(Nov.-Dec. 1985); Hayes & Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, 58 Harv.
Bus. Rev. 67 (1980); R. REICH, THE NEXT AMEalcAN FRONTER 140-72 (1983). See also "The
End of Corporate Loyalty?" Bus. Wk., Aug. 4, 1986 at 42. But see, Jarrell & Lehn, Takeover
Threats Don't Crimp Long-Term Planning, Wall St. J., May 1, 1985 at _; Pound, Lehn,
Jarrell, Are Takeovers Hostile to Economic Performance? Regulation, (Sept./Oct. 1986) at 25.
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One such effort-and others should be expected-is that of Professor
Coffee. 5 2 Professor Coffee describes two observable phenomena-the dra-
matic increase in the debt load of many corporations and the widespread
enterprise restructurings currently taking place. He considers these to be
efforts by management simultaneously to placate shareholders and to so
decompose the corporation as will ward off a possible takeover attempt.
For example, an attractive company with little debt might borrow heavily
and utilize the proceeds to repurchase stock, thereby substituting debt for
equity. This both pleases shareholders who receive substantial distributions
and frustrates potential bidders who might plan to finance stock purchases
by borrowing against target assets. 53 Similarly, companies that restructure
themselves by selling or spinning off subsidiaries or divisions and distributing
proceeds or stock to shareholders can thwart a bidder by ridding themselves,
oddly enough, of desirable businesses.
5 4
Ultimately, Professor Coffee seeks to link these phenomena with a new
theory of the firm in which takeovers are seen as a means of enabling
shareholders to impose their greater preference for risk on management and
other corporate participants. Since shareholders receive all the upside return
on riskier activity, but share the risk of failure with creditors, they may
prefer a significant amount of debt. Furthermore, management and other
employees have their labor (and perhaps capital) heavily invested in one
firm, while shareholders often hold a diversified portfolio of investments.
As such, Coffee theorizes that management is less likely than shareholders
to desire a risky course of action for the enterprise since doing so exposes a
higher percentage of their firm-specific investment to loss. 55 The threat of
takeover and resulting job loss, however, lead management to take actions-
incurring debt and restructuring-that, however pleasing to shareholders,
management would not otherwise undertake. Thus, the market for corporate
control leads corporations to act in accordance with shareholder risk pref-
erence rather than management's.
If Professor Coffee's thesis is coupled with this Article's earlier argument
that courts appear to be moving toward requiring greater management
allegiance to investor interests, shareholders may be gaining allies in both
the courtroom and the boardroom. The critical issue raised by these devel-
opments is twofold: "Why shouldn't corporations diligently advance share-
152. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate Web (Jan.,
1986) (Working Paper No. 17) (copy on file at Washington & Lee Law Review office).
153. Id. at 36.
154. Id. at 46. Empirical evidence suggests that spin-offs create shareholder wealth.
McDaniel, supra note 19, at 421 & n. 39. The SEC's Chief Economist expects to see a significant
amount of such restructuring as firms try to avoid being acquired. FED. SEC. L. RPTR. (CCH)
No. 1173, April 16, 1986, at 6.
155. Coffee, supra note 152, at 13-20. See also Baumol, supra note 93 at 89 n.9 ("[s]ome
risks that are worthwhile from the stockholders' point of view are likely to be unattractive to
management because if they turn out well no special rewards may accrue to the company
officers, whereas if they turn out badly, management may be in trouble.").
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holder welfare, both in and prior to a takeover?" and "What does the
triumph of shareholder interests signify for other private and societal inter-
ests?" Are the latter interests largely aligned with those of investors as many
proponents of takeovers claim? On the last question, Professor Coffee
speculates that such constituencies as creditors facing greater risk of default
on corporate obligations, employees facing layoffs from corporate streamlin-
ing, and the state itself as ultimate risk bearer may not be well served' 56 and,
interestingly, may in some respects be more closely aligned with manage-
ment's more conservative risk preferences.'"5 If so, perhaps neither particular
constituencies nor, as indicated earlier,'5 8 society's desire for an efficient use
of resources are furthered by the present pro-investor takeover climate.
Of course, it is possible that management has been unduly cautious in
its risk preferences and that corporations will profit by shareholders' new-
found influence. Moreover, without more widely-accepted information about
the actual effects of corporate leveraging and restructurings on noninvestor
interests, it is not definitively known whose interests are served and whose
are hurt by such activity. The present point, however, is that even if and
when those questions are answered more convincingly, the findings may
suggest, as appears to be the case, that corporate behavior beneficial for
investors may not, on balance, be good for others. As a result, corporate
takeover responses aimed at maximizing shareholder wealth, whether judi-
cially-imposed or management-initiated, may conflict with the belief that as
important social institutions corporations must be managed to serve other
interests as well.' 5 9 How does this possibility bear on corporate governance?
IV. THREE PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE TAKEOVER STANCES
Once it is acknowledged that investor interests and those of others might
differ, several questions emerge. As a policy matter, should takeovers
156. Coffee, supra note 152, at 62-65.
157. Id. at 86. For those who believe management may consider these noninvestor interests
in formulating takeover strategy, this Article's earlier criticism, supra note 110, of the judicial
failure to clarify the oft-used statement that management is a fiduciary for the "corporation
and its shareholders" is inappropriate. If noninvestor and investor interests diverge, these people
might argue that management consideration of such "corporate" interests is, if not paramount
to, at least on an equal footing with its duty to shareholders. That is one possible conclusion,
but it certainly gives management considerable discretion to pick and choose the beneficiaries
of its awesome power. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
158. See supra Section A of Part III.
159. Professor Werner recognized the dual claims of investors and others on corporate
activities: ". . . managers have become targets of two forces that often push in different
directions. One, centered about the stock market, urges decisions in the interest of shareholders.
The other, growing out of public opinion and fear of restrictive legislation, urges decisions in
the community's interest. The two can often be reconciled. But where this is impossible and
meeting community standards is likely to affect shareholders adversely, managements have
subordinated community to shareholder interest. Community good-will, desirable as that may
be, has had to bow to shareholder satisfaction." Werner, Management, Stock Market And
Corporate Reform: Berle And Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. Rev. 388, 410 (1977).




nonetheless be encouraged, or at least not impeded, because they are so
clearly beneficial for those who provide capital to corporations? Armed with
new evidence and theories on the adverse consequences of takeovers for
noninvestors, should management be allowed to respond to or prepare for a
takeover by somehow taking account of such interests? If that is unaccept-
able, how then, if at all, should the interests of others who are vitally
affected by corporate activities be factored into either society's or a particular
corporation's stance toward takeovers?
Arguably, such questions are premature given the lack of authoritative
evidence on the net effects of takeover activity. Yet, that evidence, if ever
available and widely accepted, is years away. Meanwhile, takeovers proceed
unchecked. Reconsidering larger questions of institutional purpose and the
efficacy of decisionmaking arrangements can provide in the interim a useful
sense of context, reminding us of what is ultimately at stake in more
particularized squabbles.
With that in mind, in prescribing target company behavior there appear
to be three possible kinds of responses to the issues raised above. These
perspectives deal with the takeover posture of particular companies. They
do not deal with the takeover issue by bluntly reducing the aggregate level
of takeover activity through "macro" policies since, presumably, many
takeovers do serve useful functions, and to halt such transactions altogether
may be an overreaction. The harder task is identifying, at least roughly,
those particular transfers of control that serve-by some accepted measure-
useful purposes, and determining whether market forces playing themselves
out through present or altered decisionmaking structures can accomplish
those purposes. If the manner in which takeover outcomes are currently
being decided is unsatisfactory, but no alternative arrangement for better
identifying those takeovers that "should" proceed can be devised, then a
policy response directed at the aggregate level of takeover activity may be
required.
First Perspective. Require target management both in preparing for and
responding to takeovers to focus exclusively on enhancing shareholder well
being as measured by stock prices. If this orientation leads to unsatisfactory
results for noninvestor interests, either let those interests fend for themselves
or rectify the adverse effects directly through public intervention. 60
Obviously, the precise manner in which this perspective might be fully
implemented would be the subject of debate. For example, the passivity-
resistance dispute would need resolution as to which is better for sharehold-
ers.' 6 ' If some version of the "resistance" notion prevails, as is likely,
discussion must focus on desirable (and permissible) management tactics for
maximizing shareholder gain and on how courts might better review the
propriety of such tactics. Reposing greater control in management through
160. An example of public intervention to protect noninvestor interest would be to provide
job retraining and other transitional benefits to employees terminated as a result of a takeover.
161. See infra note 104.
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such devices as nonredeemable poison pill plans or "super voting" stock
that can completely prevent takeovers would be prohibited.'62 Judges would
intensify their scrutiny of other defensive measures-e.g., whether and when
directors must redeem poison pill plans-to ensure that they are utilized
solely to improve shareholder well being. The point is that this perspective
would, on all fronts, require shareholder interests to be paramount to those
of management and others.
Several comments can be made about this perspective. First, it probably
assumes that changes in corporate control generally lead to a more efficient
use of resources. If true, this is good from a societal wide point of view, at
least over the "long run." Nonetheless, it occurs at the expense of those
specific noninvestor interests not served by such a rapid realignment of
resources. 63 Furthermore, as indicated,164 recent evidence challenges this
optimistic view of the efficiency outcome of many corporate combinations,
thereby making appropriate an inquiry into whether the full costs of such
activity are worth the gains.
Second, this perspective also assumes that any adverse effects of com-
pleted takeovers on particular noninvestor interests are identifiable within a
reasonable time period, economic in nature, capable of being remedied
(presumably by governmental action), and not too costly to correct-in
short, that the effects can be ascertained, measured, alleviated, and deter-
mined to be "worth" the gains. It is naive, however, to believe that we are
anywhere close to identifying the full effects of recent takeover activity, a
task that will require considerable time and study. Consequently, we are in
no position to state with assurance that the wrenching effects of such activity
are purely economic and, on the whole, beneficial or capable of mitigation
after the fact.
Third, at present such a perspective is biased in favor of takeovers
because of the disparity of evidence on takeover effects for investors and
noninvestors. The abundant stock price evidence on which this perspective
relies shows takeovers to be unqualifiedly good for target shareholders while
evidence on takeover consequences for noninvestor interests is less developed.
The result is a policy vacuum that creates a hospitable climate for takeovers
162. In July, 1986, the New York Stock Exchange proposed dropping its longstanding rule
requiring all shares of public companies to have equal voting rights. The end of the one-share,
one-vote rule has generated strong reaction. See, e.g., SEC Rule Change Sparks Ire, The Nat.
L. J., July 21, 1986, at 26. The SEC will hold hearings on the proposal in December, 1986.
163. Professor Demsetz recently expressed this view:
[Takeovers] don't serve the interest of everyone. They don't serve the interest of
management that might be displaced. And they don't serve the interest of employees
that may have to seek employment elsewhere. There is no way to effect change
without having someone bear costs. It might be in the country's interests to soften
the costs through unemployment insurance, subsidy, or whatever the case may be,
but I don't think it is desirable for the economy to be run by firms that individually
seek to do this, nor do I think it's possible in a free enterprise system.
SEC Economic Forum, supra note 14, at 16 (testimony of Professor Demsetz).
164. See supra Section A of Part III.
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while addressing the "costs" of such activity, if at all, only after the fact.
The uneven evidence on the effects of takeovers for investor and noninvestor
interests undoubtedly has contributed to the current absence of meaningful
federal public policy aimed either at regulating the aggregate level of takeover
activity-through tax, antitrust, credit, 165 or other "macro" policy-or at
identifying and encouraging only those acquisitions that are likely to result
in acceptable outcomes.
Fourth, even if takeovers are not in the public interest, this perspective
holds that public officials must stem the workings of the market if that is
considered necessary, not private managers who are neither authorized nor
equipped to make such "political" or "moral" decisions. 66 Instead, man-
agement must serve shareholders-its only true constituency-whether or not
that orientation is ever proven to be detrimental to others. Moreover, to
constrain management discretion, faithful -service to shareholder interests
needs a benchmark. In takeover situations, the standard is maximizing
shareholder price returns, not simply preservation of or longer term profit
maximization for the entity.
In this perspective then, the law's aim is simple. First, it should provide
an informative, non-coercive atmosphere in which investors can consider and
act on takeover offers, thereby deciding the entity's fate. 67 Second, the law
should prevent management from retaining corporate control when such
control is inimical to shareholder interests and should require management
to procure the largest reasonable premium.1 68 By furthering shareholder well
being in this manner, the law will enable the marketplace to remedy the
serious imbalance in management-shareholder relations, a longstanding and
central problem of corporate governance.
This pro-investor vision of the corporation is certainly the orthodox
economic one, though clearly in takeovers the potential tension between
investor and other interests is more obvious and pronounced. It has also
165. In January, 1986, the Federal Reserve Board made "junk bonds" subject to federal
margin rules. See Hershey, FED Adopts "Junk Bond" Curbs, N.Y. Times, January 9, 1986 at
DI. In effect, the rules provide that debt secured principally by acquired stock may not account
for more than 50% of the acquisition price. Presumably, bidders and their counsellors will seek
methods of circumventing this prohibition. Moreover, the SEC's Office of the Chief Economist
recently conducted a study of "junk bond" financing and concluded that there was no need
for regulation to curb its use. [Current] FED. SEC. L. R'rR. (CCH) 84,011 (JUNE 20, 1986).
166. For Professor Stone's recent response to this general position see Stone, supra note
13, at 566-73. Stone's defense of "voluntary" corporate responsibility, while forceful, provides
management with considerable leeway in takeovers. His assertion that "adverse precedential
consequences" are simply one cost of voluntarism, id. at 570-71 n.14, seems unsuited to
takeovers. Managers might easily adopt a one-time "socially responsible" stance in takeovers
while eschewing it in operating decisions, rather than vice versa, and remain undisturbed by
any inconsistency in attitude. The issue is whether management's ability to so act will lead to
substantially reduced accountability to shareholders by defusing takeovers without at the same
time leading to any sustainable "socially responsible" action.
167. This is essentially the aim of the federal tender offer laws.
168. This goal is the domain of state corporate fiduciary laws.
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influenced federal policy and, as argued,' 69 there is a discernible trend in
decisional law toward this view. No doubt the law has been remiss in favoring
management's end of its relationship with investors. But this perspective
forgets that the corporation is a web of mutual interdependencies. The
shareholder claim on corporate activities is not inherently superior to that of
others on either "ownership" or, in takeovers, risk-bearing grounds. Ulti-
mately to rest the corporation's legitimacy on faithful allegiance to capital
is to demean the contributions of others and, in the end, to expect very little
of the institution.
Second Perspective. Enable target management to prepare for or respond
to a takeover attempt by taking into account and possibly protecting non-
investor constituencies.'70
This perspective often is espoused by management,'7 ' a group that outside
the takeover setting may or may not be particularly receptive to noninvestor
considerations. 7 2 This view is shared by several state legislatures which have
sought to protect local noninvestor interests from the serious dislocation
believed to follow from many takeovers. 73 Finally, this perspective might be
considered the natural extension of Dodd's call for management to act as
"trustee" for noninvestor interests, 17 4 or Professor White's suggestion that
corporations behave as good "citizens."' 17 5
Courts have long allowed management to assume (or argue that it was
assuming) this role by obscuring any distinction between duty to the corporate
enterprise and duty to shareholders, and by almost reflexively applying the
business judgment rule to challenged defensive measures. Revlon and other
recent decisions portend a judicial effort to require stricter allegiance to
investor interests and to return the corporate sufferage to shareholders on
takeover decisions. Yet, if developing evidence reveals a divergence of
investor and noninvestor interests in takeovers, this judicial trend may lead
to a renewed claim that management be empowered to defend against
169. See infra Section C of Part II.
170. This perspective is somewhat similar to what Professor Clark has recently called "high
idealism." Clark, What is the Proper Role of 1he Corporation?, in PuIiuc-PivATE PARTNER-
stop: NEw OPPORTuNrES FOR MEETING SocIAL NEDs 195, 205-210 (H- Brooks, eL al eds.
1984). Professor Clark considers arguments for and against this orientation, concluding that
.. no one knows with certainty that corporations transformed in accord with some leading
version of high idealism would fail to make a net improvement in the overall welfare of our
society. The hard questions are ultimately empirical ones, and high idealism has not yet been
tried on a significant scale in the American setting. ' Id. at 210. It has been, however, increasingly
articulated-whether or not ultimately practiced-by target management in takeovers. See supra
note 29 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
172. For a view that noninvestor factors are considered in corporate decisionmaking, see
Subak, Takeovers: Where Are We? Where Do We Go?, 41 Bus. LAW. 1255, 1257 (1986).
173. See Johnson, supra note 27, at 190 nn.18-20.
174. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
175. See White, supra note 10.
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takeovers, not from self interest, but on behalf of other valued claimants. 176
The implications of such a perspective are several. First, if management
could altogether prevent a takeover out of supposed solicitude for one or
more noninvestor groups, shareholders would have no "right" to receive
tender offers and premiums for their stock. Even if management did not
completely thwart a takeover attempt, but merely sought a resolution that
was more favorable to noninvestor interests than other options, that too
might damage investors if such an outcome did not also provide the maximum
premium.
Initially, granting management such power might be regarded as further
erosion of the already limited incidents of stock ownership. But what rights
inhere in a share of stock? Capital providers are surely entitled to conscien-
tious and ethical effort toward long run profit maximization. Does stock
ownership also include the right to act en masse with fellow shareholders in
abruptly shortening investment horizons whenever an outsider perceives an
opportunity to arbitrage the asset and stock markets? Mobility of capital is
generally desirable for those possessing as well as those needing funds.
Acknowledging that, further consideration of the exact nature of an inves-
tor's rightful "ownership" claim on a corporation embedded in a myriad of
relationships would still be useful. This is particularly important since capital
is more agile than other resources and the critical issue is less the need for
continual economic adjustment than the abruptness with which takeovers
cause such change. Perhaps capital providers simply cannot remain isolated
from the problems caused by single-minded attentiveness to their interests in
takeovers and must be more patient in seeking returns or in moving to new
endeavors. This may seem an odd turn of events to those who have long
bemoaned the relative impotence of investors in corporate activities, but
perhaps takeovers have changed the corporate landscape that dramatically.
176. State legislation may be needed for the requisite authority. Pennslyvania's corporate
statute was amended in 1983 to specifically authorize directors and officers to consider the
interests of employees, suppliers, customers, and local communities in deciding what is in the
best interest of the corporation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon 1985). In 1984, Ohio
enacted a similar provision. Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Page 1985). While directors must
consider the interest of investors, they may also consider the interests of employees, suppliers,
creditors, customers, the community, and the state and national economy. Id. If such legislation
meets the same fate as other state takeover legislation, see supra note 27 and accompanying
text, federal legislation or shareholder consent through charger amendment will be necessary.
See, e.g., Article X of Certificate of Incorporation of Control Data Corporation, reprinted in
Aoru, supra note 10, at 179, which provides as follows: "[T]he board of directors... shall, in
connection with the exercise of its judgment in determining what is in the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders, give due consideration to all relevant factors, including without
limitation, the social and economic effects on the employees, customers, suppliers, and other
constituents of the corporation and its subsidiaries and on the communities in which the
corporation and its subsidiaries operate or are located." Apparently, such charter amendments
are becoming more frequent and one such provision has even served as the basis for a board
of directors rejecting a cash acquisition offer. See Sussman & Sussman, Litigation Intensifies
on Duties of Targets Directors, Legal Times, May 26, 1986, at 10, 12, n.38.
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Second, in this perspective the real issue then is not simply premiums
for shareholders, but determining the significance of takeovers in assuring
management accountability to the long-run interests of the enterprise. Given
the nagging problem of accountability, it is tempting to embrace the takeover
as a welcomed panacea. But, again, accountability to whom, for what end?
Presumably, what is desired are mechanisms for efficiently assuring that
management does not shirk or prefer its own interests to those of the
enterprise. That objective ultimately serves investor as well as other interests
congruent with the chosen business policy, but, economic and corporate
finance theory notwithstanding, it may be altogether different than facilitat-
ing the desire of many shareholders to extract value from an enterprise as
rapidly as possible.
Perhaps other methods of disciplining management have been slighted,
both "market" mechanisms and the more traditional "rules" approach. An
invigorated proxy system-with institutional investors playing a more active
role-and more meaningful intra-corporate litigation are possibilities for
keeping management alert and its loyalties undivided. The product market,
certainly a more vigorous disciplinarian in an increasingly international
market, and the market for management services are still operating, even-
tually culling out unneeded products and talents at a pace that allows some
time for preparation and adjustment. Perhaps it is not essential that alleged
inefficiencies be immediately driven from sight through the harsh workings
of the market for corporate control. Shock can severely damage social as
well as human organisms, sometimes disabling the usual decisionmaking
mechanisms and causing regrettable actions. Less hurried, more thoughtful
adaptation to the incessant process of "creative destruction"'77 may have
important benefits.
Finally, given the need for greater attentiveness to noninvestor consid-
erations and conceding limits on shareholder entitlements, one still wonders
whether management is trained or equipped to serve as Platonic guardian,
mediating the appetite of shareholders for a premium and the desire of
employees and the local community to mightily resist. Even if management
overcame its inherent conflict of interest in takeover decisions and generally
made the "right" decisions, its sheer ability to play this role might be
unsettling. 78 Equally troubling is the possibility that this "free hand" may
not be adequately checked by market or other monitoring mechanisms, or
tempered by management's hoped-for sense of responsibility and recognition
of the need to maintain public trust. Moreover, by its very nature there is
no way to know how management will exercise its discretion. Discretion may
177. J. SHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY Ch. VII (1942).
178. One response to this concern is that corporate management currently has a great deal
of unchecked power that, assumedly since it is allowed to continue holding such power, is being
exercised in roughly the ways society expects. It is ironic that, in the name of limiting
management discretion, a proscription of stewardly behavior might prevent management from
doing what many in society probably expect of it in takeovers.
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be used to implement defensive measures-e.g., selling "crown jewels" and
effecting various "scorched earth" tactics-that injure the business and
diminish shareholder prospects for a premium. On the other hand, discretion
might be exercised to help shareholders and damage noninvestor interests
through management efforts to preempt takeover attempts that themselves
seriously hobble a company's future. Thus, the problem for those who adopt
this perspective is the lack of any steady reference point for management's
behavior and a perception, by many, that it is more a rationalization for
bolstering management power than a sign of genuine compassion for non-
investors.
Third Perspective. Assuming that the aggregate level of takeover activity
is not significantly reduced by policy initiatives or other factors, devise one
or more means of allowing advance consideration of investor and noninvestor
interests in takeovers.
This perspective is grounded on the belief that corporations and the
forces affecting them are important to the well being of persons and groups
other than just shareholders. Any substantial doubt as to whether takeovers,
whatever their wealth benefits for shareholders, generally serve a critical
governance or resource reallocation function should prompt the search for
innovative means of assessing-or at least providing avenues of expression
for-various claims on a corporation in a way that will give them genuine
attention and consideration. Unlike the First Perspective, however, this
perspective does not simply deal with the consequences of completed takeo-
vers, nor, as in the Second Perspective, does it utilize management as the
sole mechanism for protecting noninvestor interests. Instead, it seeks to
tamper with the management-centered decisionmaking apparatus of the
corporation, meliorating its deficiencies with the creation of some body or
process designed, ideally, to "perceive, to project consequences, to weigh
alternatives, etcetera, roughly in the way a responsible person does.' ' 79 The
aim of this perspective is much the same as that recently described by Lord
Wedderburn in a larger, not specifically takeover-related context:
The need is for mechanisms, both internal to and external to the
enterprise, through which wider social responsibility can emerge ..
[T]he difficulties now lie not so much in the identification of
constituencies to be represented as in the methods and procedures
by which their equitable representation can evolve. On that basis,
democratic processes might establish procedures through which di-
verse claims of social "constituencies" in corporate groupings could
be, at least transitionally, balanced. That balance might be accepted
as... only the basis for the next round of argument.8 0
Currently, there is no broadly-based consensus to solve the quandary of
requiring management to focus on one rather than another interest group by
179. Stone, supra note 13, at 560. See generally P. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY Ch. 3 (1984) (arguing for view of corporation as moral actor).
180. Wedderburn, supra note 45, at 44.
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proceeding in this manner, either in a general sense or as applied specifically
to the takeover issue.'18 Furthermore, however worthy the abstract aim, it
might be extremely difficult to attain agreement on either the methods or
the calculus to be used in weighing various interests affected by a takeover
and in determining whether a particular takeover should take place and, if
so, on what terms. Moreover, some might consider such intrusion into
corporate decisionmaking to be too radical, preferring instead that various
constituencies become more adept at "bargaining" with the corporation on
takeover aspects of their relationship. Finally, however unsatisfying the other
perspectives, that alone is certainly no guarantee that this perspective is
workable.
These are not trivial objections. Nonetheless, at the risk of hindering
further consideration of this perspective by revealing the current dearth of
concrete proposals for its implementation, the following may serve as a
beginning point for more imaginative solutions: use of wholly independent
directors'82 or committees to evaluate takeovers; 83 board or takeover com-
mittee representation of various constituencies;' 84 special public "directors"
with limited tenure appointed specifically for consideration of takeover
issues; 181 former Justice Goldberg's recommendation for the establishment
181. For examples of this approach in non-takeover settings, see Stone, supra note 13, at
563-64.
182. The Delaware Supreme Court recently indicated that concerns about a takeover
attempt's effect on corporate policy and effectiveness are "materially enhanced" when defensive
measures are approved by a board comprised of a majority of outside independent directors.
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. See also Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986) (presence of ten
outside directors on Texaco's 13 person board, coupled with investment banking and legal
advice, constituted prima facie showing of good faith and reasonable investigation in connection
with a challenged transaction). In Revlon it was not clear that a majority of directors were
"truly outside independent directors." 506 A.2d at 176 n.3. See also Edelman v. Fruehauf
Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. RPTR. (CCH) 92,863 (6th Cir. 1986) (approval of management
buy-out by independent directors did not shield transaction from attack where directors "rubber
stamped" proposal).
183. In 1983 shareholders of Superior Oil Co. adopted a proposal to create an independent
committee to consider any takeover offer for 45% or more of the company's shares. The
purpose of the committee was to determine whether the offer was fair, and if so, to recommend
acceptance of the offer to the full board. Davis, supra note 64, at 9 n.41. Such a committee
would, under the Third Perspective, assess the offer from a broader point of view.
184. On constituency representation, see R. NADER, M. GREENE AND J. SELIGMAN, TAMING
THE GIANT CORPORATION 152-83 (1976); see STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL
OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 134-83 (1975). For a recent critique of constituency representation on
the board using a "transaction costs" analysis, see Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE
L. JOURNAL 1197 (1984). See also Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors:
Fond Hope-Faint Promise, 76 MICH. L. REV. 581, 598-602 (1978) (critical of "non-establish-
ment" directors participation in operating decisions).
185. Stone, Public Directors Merit a Try, HARV. Bus. REv. 20, (March-April 1976); Stone,
supra note 184, at 174-83; Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the
Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L. REV. 343
(1981) (proposing establishment of National Director Corps). For a balanced critique of "public




of an independent person or institution, modeled after the British Panel on
Take-Overs and Mergers, to evaluate takeovers from a broad vantage point;
8 6
provide affected constituencies with increased stock ownership and/or the
right to acquire stock ownership and to participate in the bidding process in
the event of a potential control change181 In addition, there might be
increased disclosure of the expected "impact" of a takeover on various
interests along with some protection of these interests, perhaps in the way
of payment to them either from target company assets or by the acquiror.
Examples might be the payment of severance and/or retraining benefits in
the event of employee layoffs of a certain level within a particular period
after the change of control and similar payments to enterprise-dependent
communities. If the "costs" of many takeovers are indeed borne by employ-
ees or communities or, ultimately, society at large, it may be appropriate for
investors who are leaving the enterprise with premiums reflecting the value
of assets enhanced by noninvestor efforts to absorb some of the costs of
their rapid departure.1'
All of these specific proposals have drawbacks.8 9 Unless the practical
difficulties are insurmountable, however, what is valuable about this per-
spective is its unconventional approach, an approach that may be worth ex-
186. Goldberg, Regulation of Hostile Tender Offers: A Dissenting View and Recommended
Reforms, 43 MD. L. REV. 225 (1984). Justice Goldberg suggests that tender offers be evaluated
for their fairness to the shareholders and to the public. Id. at 233. As with proposals to modify
the composition of the board, more detail is needed as to the exact composition of such a
reviewing panel, how members would be appointed and removed, and precisely what factors
ought to be considered in making its evaluation. For a description of the British model see
DeMott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons from the British, 58 N.Y. U. L.
REv. 945 (1983).
187. There has been a substantial increase in the use of employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs). See Blumstein, The New Role for Esop's, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1985, at D-1. See
Simmons, Ward & Watson, An Esop Can Be an Effective Anti-Takeover Device, The Nat'l L.
J., June 30, 1986, at 25. See also Smith, Colt Industries Uses Novel Re-Capitalization that
Sharply Boosts Debt to Lift Stock Price, Wall St. J., July 24, 1986, at 53 (describing Colt
Industries' plan to increase employee ownership from 7% to at least 30% using debt rather
than cash investment by workers). Increasing employee ownership of a corporation is likely to
make a takeover more difficult. Less attention has been given to the possibility of providing
employees with an option or right of first refusal to purchase stock that is triggered upon
commencement of a control contest, or even allowing employees (not just management as in
the usual leveraged buyout) to acquire stock from current shareholders at a market price.
188. Professor Coffee also considers the possibility of a "premium-sharing" arrangement.
Coffee, supra note 152, at 81-87. See also Commentary, I Bus. & PROF. ETHiCS 1. 35 (1982)
(commentary of Elmer Johnson on article by John Kavanaugh wherein Johnson proposes that
in plant relocation decisions corporate board of directors should approve fair plan of severance
payment to employees and community). A related idea is the extension of wrongful discharge
laws to plant closings. Rhine, Business Closings and Their Effects on Employees, 8 IND. REL.
LJ. 362 (1986).
189. For example, the issue of enforcement needs to be addressed since an effective means
of implementing the desired outcome is needed. Furthermore, these proposals do not deal with
the preemptive measures described by Professor Coffee, supra Section B of Part Ill. Nonetheless,
management may refrain from taking such actions if there is some assurance that takeovers will
be assessed from a standpoint other than just that of shareholders.
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ploring because a decision-making body or process not controlled by manage-
ment may allow for advance consideration and accommodation of various
interests in a way that management-dominated boards cannot. That is, if in-
terests other than those of investors are important and if there is at least some
doubt as to whether a high level of takeover activity serves such interests,
this Third Perspective reminds us that, in formulating law and policy on
takeovers, such interests need not be ignored or relegated to the protection
of management.
In essence, this perspective considers the view that the current market
for corporate control works for the general good as a case yet to be proven,
and continued unchecked takeover activity premised on that view to be a
massive experiment to test one model of the corporation. Furthermore, this
perspective considers the question of "For whom is management a trustee"?
to be a legal antinomy, raising objections in whatever direction management
turns. This perspective then is simply a suggestion that perhaps some process
or body or combination of solutions, whether within or without the corpo-
ration, might be better equipped than management and its advisers, judges,
shareholders, or the "market" to assess and redistribute the impact of large-
scale takeovers.
So viewed, consideration of this Third Prospective may be fruitful simply
because takeovers are a social phenomenon which current conceptions of
management responsibility are not handling well. Perhaps, upon identifica-
tion of a particular social problem that touches corporations, it is better not
to expect management to be the source of all solutions but to create
a solution mechanism precisely designed for the purpose with specific
powers, decision-making procedures and standards of liability. This
reflects precisely the change from an interest group approach [i.e.,
who should management protect] to a problem-oriented, functional
approach. '90
Whatever the preferred perspective, takeover-related developments are
presenting a challenge both to corporations themselves and to current atti-
tudes toward the proper ends of corporate and management behavior.
Whether seen as a discrete problem or as related to and shedding light upon
more general corporate issues, takeovers bring to the fore the significance of
corporate activities to our society. Traditional ways of viewing the corporate
institution and its goals and decisionmaking structures-prescribed by lawyers
and more recently economists-may not take adequate account of this
significance.
190. Teubner, Corporate Fiduciary Duties and their Beneficiaries, in CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE AND DiREcTORs LIABILITIES 149, 172 (K. Hopt & G. Teubner eds. 1985).
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